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Foreword 
With the completion of the Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (popularly known also as the Brundtland Commission Report) 
in 1987, and the subsequent worldwide attention given to that study, the concept 
of ecologically sustainable development has gained broad recognition. It is now 
commonly acknowledged that economic development and ecological sustainabil-
ity are not contradictory goals. To the contrary, they are interdependent - the 
economy of a country cannot grow over the long term, when its environment is 
being hopelessly degraded, and a country experiencing severe ecological degrada-
tion cannot restore its environment without developing economically. Most of 
the focus of ecologically sustainable development has been on the less developed 
countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Because of the desperate straits of 
the populations in those areas, such focus is certainly merited. 
Our IIASA study, focused on Europe, had at its inception in 1985 two 
goals. The first was methodological. We reasoned that if in fact it were possible 
to conduct a study of European environmental problems 40 years into the future, 
perhaps similar studies could be conducted for the less developed continents. 
We believe that this European "experiment" has been successful and we strongly 
support the undertaking of "future environments" studies elsewhere in the world. 
The second goal was one of substance. What precisely could we learn 
about the major environmental problems that could confront future generations 
of Europeans, and how would we begin to solve those problems now, rather than 
bequeathing them, in their most severe manifestations, to our children and 
grandchildren? We also believe we have succeeded, at least in part, in realizing 
this goal. 
I am pleased, therefore, to introduce this very important study for I believe 
it will be a major contribution to the ongoing effort to achieve an ecologically 
sustainable world. 
I would also like to single out for special praise the study's two sponsors, 
the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning, and the Environment, Leidschen-
dam, The Netherlands, and the Ministry of the Environment, Prospective 
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Group, Paris , France, who had the wisdom and foresight in 1985 to understand 
the potential importance of this study, and without whose support and constant 






This study analyzes eleven European environmental policy "dilemmas" for four 
alternative socioeconomic development pathways to the year 2030. The dilem-
mas include problems associated with: water management, soil acidification, 
forestry wood supply, marginalized land, sea level rise, coastal problems, chemi-
cal "time bombs", non-point source toxic materials, transport growth, urbaniza-
tion, and summer oxidant episodes. On the basis of this analysis, the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
• Because of the linkages between the European and global environments, 
sustaining the European environment in the 21st century cannot be fully 
achieved without sustaining the global environment . 
• The continuation of present trends in economic development and environ-
mental protection in Europe and elsewhere is not sufficient to prevent 
further deterioration of the European environment. 
• High economic growth in Europe and elsewhere without adequate environ-
mental protection accompanying such growth will lead to even more severe 
environmental problems. 
• Environmentally friendly development in Europe offers the hope of mitigat-
ing local and regional-scale problems specific to Europe. 
• But these actions, in and of themselves, cannot solve problems within 
Europe stemming from global scale changes. To accomplish the latter, the 
rest of the world must also follow environmentally friendly pathways. 
• Thus, European nations should do all in their power to enact environmen-
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FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS FOR EUROPE: 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF 
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PATHS 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Global Problem 
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In spite of enormous advances in our ability to understand, interpret, and ulti-
mately manage the natural world, we approach the 21st century in awesome 
ignorance of what is likely to unfold, in terms of both the human activities that 
affect the environment and the responses of the earth to those activities. One 
certain fact is that the planet will be subjected to pressures hitherto unpre-
cedented in its evolutionary history. The world's population is likely to grow 
from 5 to 8.2 billion within 35 years. Over this same time period, energy con-
sumption could easily double relative to 1980, food production must increase by 
3% to 4% yearly, and general economic activities could grow up to fivefold 
[report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 
1987)]. 
Moreover, "tomorrow's world" will not simply be an inflated version of 
"today's world" with more people, more energy consumption, more industry, and 
so on. Rather, the world of the 21st century will be qualitatively different from 
today in at lea.st three important respects. First, new technologies will transform 
the relationship of man to _the natural world. In the positive sense, industry will 
pass from an emphasis on products to be manufactured to an emphasis on func-
tions to be performed (Colombo, 1985) . A prime example is the gradual transi-
tion from an agriculture heavily dependent on chemicals to one that is essentially 
biologically intensive through the application of biotechnologies . In the negative 
sense, the release of bioengineered organisms may pose new kinds of risks if the 
development and use of such organisms are not carefully controlled . 
The second major change differentiating tomorrow's world from today's is 
climatic change. Owing to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere, average annual global temperatures are expected to increase to levels 
higher than at any t ime over the la.st 200,000 years. And yet even t he most 
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advanced climate models currently cannot predict how regional and continental 
climates will change. 
Third, as noted by Clark (1987a), society has moved beyond the era of 
localized and relatively simple environmental problems. What were once local 
incidents of pollution shared throughout a common watershed or air basin now 
involve many nations. What were once acute, short-lived episodes of reversible 
damage now affect many generations. What were once straightforward questions 
of conservation versus development now reflect complex linkages. These prob-
lems will become more pronounced over the next century, as society enters an 
era of increasingly complex patterns of interdependence of the global economy 
and the world environment. 
Relative to earlier generations of problems, these emerging patterns of 
interaction are characterized by profound scientific ignorance, enormous decision 
costs, and temporal and spatial scales transcending those of most contemporary 
political and regulatory institutions. 
1.2. The European Problem 
The European environment is tightly linked to the global environment by global 
systems such as climate and stratospheric ozone. Typically, such linkages are 
reciprocal in nature - European activities affect the global environment, and 
what happens outside of Europe affects the European environment. Moreover, 
European supply and demand for natural resources are linked to global supply 
and demand. Thus, for example, the use of European land for wood production 
will depend to a large degree on the availability (or lack thereof) of global forest 
supplies. Hence, the problem of managing the European environment must be 
viewed within the context of the global environment. 
However, it is important to note that not all of Europe's problems are glob-
al ones; European societies can do much to put their house in order regardless of 
what is occurring on the global scale. Effects such as acid deposition and the 
build-up and release of toxic materials are essentially regional and continental-
scale problems. Although even these are coupled to climate by complex feed-
backs, their solutions depend explicitly on European actions to mitigate these 
effects. 
1.3. The Goals of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide new insights into the long-term manage-
ment of the European environment during an era of fundamental transitions in 
technologies, climate, and scale of effects. The word environment is taken to 
include not only air, water, soil, forests, etc. but also the quality of life in a gen-
eral sense. The area studied is Europe, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to 
the Ural mountains, and the period of time studied extends from the present to 
the year 2030. The focus is on ecologically sustainable development, in terms of 
both the opportunities afforded to European societies in seeking to achieve it and 
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the constraints imposed on development by the slow adaptive capacities of eco-
logical systems. 
As a fundamental premise, we assume that management of long-term 
environmental problems can be improved despite considerable uncertainties that 
will continue to thwart the formulation of detailed predictions of future environ-
ments (White, 1983). ·Hence, the study's focus is not on predicting the future, or 
even on predicting an array of futures. Instead we assume that the future is un-
certain and we propose new methods of managing the present in such a way that 
future technological, socioeconomic and environmental developments will not 
produce major shocks on society, and in fact may be beneficial in some cases. 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
(1) To characterize the large-scale environmental transformations that could 
be associated with plausible scenarios of Europe's socioeconomic develop-
ment over the next 40 years or so, with special attention being given to a 
few not impossible alternative scenarios or technological breakthroughs that 
might occur. 
(2) To describe and assess the effectiveness of alternative technological and 
institutional steps to manage long-term, large-scale interactions of Europe's 
future development with its natural environment. 
(3) To identify the research and monitoring priorities for improving the ability 
of scientists to provide policy relevant assessments of the environmental 
transformations described in (1). 
2. Methods 
2.1. The Construction of Plausible Scenarios 
There is no doubt that the current state of the European environment is greatly 
affected by political and socioeconomic actions sometimes stretching back over 
many centuries. A study of future environments for Europe must therefore begin 
with an assessment of political and socioeconomic factors, and some working 
hypotheses (scenarios) for the future. These must then be coupled with scenarios 
of environmental trends. In both cases, the number of possible indicators is so 
large that it is necessary to limit the choice. 
Our selection, shown in Table 2.1, was developed after a review of various 
studies [Brundtland Commission report (WCED, 1987), etc.] and after discus-
sions with peers in the science and policy communities. Even this "wish list" is 
too large, and the working set of indicators will be rather smaller. The choice of 
sectors, components and indicators is of crucial importance. 
We should mention here that the scenarios to be presented are assumed to 
be plausible, but not necessarily probable. Who could be so rash as to predict the 
environmental state of Europe in the year 2030? Our goal is to use the scenarios 
as "straw men" to illustrate some of the current dilemmas in Europe and to help 
in the development of robust policies for managing the present to cope with the 
very uncertain future. . 
4 
Table 2.1. Selected socioeconomic sectors, environmental components and associated in-
dicators. 
Socioeconomic Sectora Associated Indicators 
Population Annual change in numbers and ages 
Energy En~r~y production by fuel type, S02 and C02 
em1ss1ons 
Industry and transportation Labour force, production capacity, pollution 
em1ss1ons 
Agriculture Yields, soil type 
Forestry Annual wood supply and wood use increments 
Cross-sectoral Water demand 
Environmental components 
Climate Temperature, precipitation and interannual 
variabilities 
Hydrology Sea level rise, water availability, soil moisture, 
lake and groundwater levels, river flows and 
interannual variabilities 
Air quality S02, 0 3, NOx and C02 concentrations; S deposi-
ti on 
Soil quality Acidification, salinization, erosion, nutrient 
depletion/saturation, absorption capacity, 
toxification 
Water quality Acidification, eutrophication, toxification 
Biota Primary productivity, species diversity, en-
dangered species 
Land use Percent of land used for forest, agriculture, built-
up areas 
Another point to be emphasized is that environmental impacts are fre-
quently delayed for decades (environmental "time bombs") and displaced in 
space, sometimes through series of poorly understood intermediate interactions. 
Great uncertainties surround these long-term and large-scale issues, but there is 
nevertheless a very real need to formulate appropriate environmental policies. 
See Stigliani (1988), for an elaboration of the problem. 
Finally it should be noted with regret that although the sectoral approach 
is used for convenience, compartmentalization by sectors and environmental 
components is one of the causes of poor environmental management. Such an 
approach masks the essential features of the global problematique, viz., the 
myriad of linkages and feedbacks. To compensate partially for this compartmen-
talization, the scenarios will be followed in Section 4.8 by a summary discussion 
of the internal consistency amongst scenarios. 
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2.2. The Selection of Not-Impossible Alternative Scenarios 
The scenarios mentioned above evolve smoothly from present conditions. The 
possibility exists, however, that a scenario curve may change slope or even 
undergo a rather sharp discontinuity. Such low-probability but not-impossible 
happenings are called turning points in this report. These divergences from the 
most plausible scenarios are assumed to occur in the first 30 years of the 21st 
century but the indicated year in each of the figures (see, for example, Figure 
9.2) should be taken only as a rough estimate. 
2.3. Elaborating the Resulting Policy Dilemmas 
Having created sets of scenarios and turning points (Sections 3 and 4), a series of 
policy dilemmas has been produced (Section 5). These dilemmas have been used 
to challenge very senior European scientists, environmental managers and policy 
analysts in carefully organized "Policy Exercises" . Here it should be re-
emphasized that a primary objective is to develop a new style of long-term 
environmental management. Another is to resolve specific issues, which in any 
event are evolving over time and require the use of adaptive management strat-
egies. Thus the policy dilemmas are vehicles for reaching our goals. 
3. Socioeconomic Futures for Europe* 
3.1. General Socioeconomic Scenarios for Europe 
Studies of European environmental futures must fail unless socioeconomic factors 
are taken into account. Four principles shaping human behaviour are 1) mainte-
nance of some hierarchical structure (based upon birth, education and wealth, 
for example); 2) a desire to have knowledge prior to making decisions (including 
those about the environment); 3) the "business-as-usual" syndrome of the indus-
trial and commercial sectors; and 4) growth (including overcoming scarcity and 
managing abundance). In this connection, the environment may be damaged by 
both high and low income groups in society (e.g., over-use of energy in industri-
alized countries and of fuel wood in developing countries). Historical experience 
suggests that although social change is usually very slow, the cumulative effects 
may be quite substantial. 
In a general sense, some plausible socioeconomic hypotheses for Europe 
include: 
• An increasing emphasis on the desirability of better environmental quality, 
leading for example to continuing progress in the internalization of the 
costs of environmental damages. 
• Many of the ideaa contained in this Section were developed at a Taak Force Meeting held at IIASA 29 
February - 1March,1988. 
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• An increase in cottage industries and other home activities. 
• A net migration of industry out of Europe. 
• An increase in unemployment. Full employment may be a paradigm for 
the 20th century but not the 21st. The work week will decrease and leisure 
time will increase correspondingly, with an associated increase in travel and 
leisure-related activities. These trends are shown in Figure 9.1. 
• In Western Europe at least, a decline in the importance of national bound-
aries. Many retired people will spend their winters in Southern Europe. 
Similarly there will be increasing summer recreational pressure on the Alps. 
Work week 
1970 2000 2030 
Figure 9.1 . Some hypothesized social trends in Europe to the year 2030. 
Some not-impossible turning points include the following: 
• War. 
• A sudden, severe economic depression. 
• Migrations due to economic or environmental factors. 
• Public pressure, whether right or wrong, that the quality of life as mea-
sured by, for example, the unemployment rate, has become intolerable, 
leading to major new actions by governments. 
3.2. Population 
Figure 9.2 gives a plausible scenario and some turning points for population 
changes in Europe up to year 2050 (Wolf et al., 1988). The conventional-wisdom 
scenario (third curve from the bottom) is that of the United Nations, which is 
based on the assumption that fertility, which has been falling since 1960 will rise 
slowly, almost reaching the replacement level by the year 2020. Introducing a 
plausible increase in immigration of one million persons annually from 1995 to 
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2004 (third curve from the top) has little effect on total population. However, 
the following turning points are not impossible: 
• A baby boom occurring in the period 1990-2015, of about the same size as 
that just after World War II (uppermost curve). 
• A "magic drug" becoming available, decreasing mortality by 50% for peo-
ple over 60 years of age {second curve from the top). 
• A fertility decline to a level that is already reached in some Western Euro-
pean countries (second curve from the bottom). 
• An AIDS-like epidemic, with 50% of 30-50 year old people dying after 
2010, the rest of the population not being affected (lowermost curve). 
The rationale for these curves is given in Wolf et al. (1988). 
Population 












1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Figure 9.2. Scenarios for population size in Europe, not including the European part of 
the USSR (Wolf et al., 1988) . 
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3.3. Energy 
The European energy scenarios for 1980 to 2000 are based on the official energy 
pathways reported by each of the European countries; the projections to the year 
2030 are based on a conventional technology scenario described in Rogner 
(1986). The results are summarized in Tables S.1 to S.S, successively for Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe. 
Table S.1. Energy consumption in Europe (in exajoule) (percentage distribution in 
brackets). 
Year Coal Oil Gtu Nuclear Hydropower Other Total 
1980 29 44 19 3 5 2 102 
(29%) (43%) (19%) (3%) (5%) (2%) 
2000 37 40 32 18 7 2 136 
(27%) (30%) (24%) (13%) (5%) (1%) 
2030 48 32 39 34 11 5 169 
(28%) (19%) (23%) (20%) (6%) (3%) 
Table S.2. Energy consumption in Eastern Europe (including the European part of the 
USSR) (in exajoule) (percentage distribution in brackets). 
Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydropower Other Total 
1980 18 17 12 1 1 2 51 
(36%) (33%) {24%) (1%) {3%) (3%) 
2030 27 13 25 22 5 1 93 
(29%) (14%) {27%) {24%) (5%) (1%) 
Table S.S. Energy consumption in Western Europe (in exajoule) (percentage distribu-
tion in brackets). 
Year Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydropower Other Total 
1980 11 27 8 2 4 1 52 
(22%) (52%) (15%) (4%) (7%) (1%) 
2030 21 19 14 12 6 4 76 
(27%) (25%) (18%) (16%) (8%) (6%) 
The main features of the scenario for Europe as a whole (Table S.1) are as 
follows: 
• Increasing consumption of total energy. 
• Decreasing importance of oil (both in absolute and relative terms). 
• Increasing use of nuclear energy. 
• A rather stable contribution of coal and gas to total energy consumption. 
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While coal and oil are the major fuel types in Eastern Europe during the 
1980's, the scenario in Table 9.2 shows coal remaining the major fuel type, with 
gas becoming as important as coal around the year 2030. 
As seen in Table 9.9, oil is nowadays the major fuel type in Western 
Europe, contributing to over half of the total energy consumption. Its relative 
importance is expected to decrease significantly, such that coal and oil will 
become equally important before the middle of the next century, amounting to 
about half of the total energy consumption. 
Not-impossible turning points are: 
(a) Increased public resistance to nuclear power, including a moratorium on 
the development of nuclear power generation. There are two possible 
results. Messner and Strubegger (1986) conclude that the effect on 
Europe's energy systems would be manageable and that natural gas would 
replace nuclear energy. Alternatively, coal could be the replacement form 
of energy. 
(b) Development of "safe-fail" reactors and better communication between the 
nuclear industry and the public, overcoming public resistance to nuclear 
power. It should be pointed out that fusion is not likely to be ready before 
the year 2050. 
(c) Large supplies of natural gas (biogenic or non-biogenic) are discovered at 
deep levels in the earth. 
(d) Development of hydrogen-based energy systems through the separation of 
carbon from natural gas, or through the electrolysis of sea water. Energy 
for carbon separation or electrolysis could come from nuclear or solar 
power. 
(e) Development of technology for capturing C02 emissions from the burning 
of fossil fuels. 
(f) Breakthroughs in the efficiency of energy transmission and use, which could 
greatly decrease energy demand in Tables 9.1 through 9.9, by as much as 
20% in the year 2015 and 40% by the year 2030. For example, supercon-
ductivity at ambient temperatures could make feasible the generation of 
electricity without transmission losses. 
(g) A shift towards the goal of achieving sustainable energy futures by the end 
of the 21st century. This would require fundamental structural and life-
style changes. Nakicenovic and Messner (1982) postulate two scenarios: a) 
a "hard solar" scenario which relies upon sustainable use of biomass, 
hydropower and solar thermal potentials and b) a "soft solar" scenario 
which relies to the maximum possible extent on decentralized, local and 
on-site energy conversion. 
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3.4. Industry and Transportation 
Some plausible scenarios include the following: 
(a) Industry 
One of the underlying hypotheses is that economies of scope or flexibility of pro-
duction will be one of the driving forces of industrial development. This means 
that competitive advantages are sought by diversification and customizing of 
products and thus by focusing on special market niches. These developments are 
taking place especially in manufacturing industries, but also increasingly in the 
heavy process industries. There will also be an increased level of automation, 
more efficient use of materials and energy, recycling of water, and lower emis-
sions of pollutants to air and water. Biotechnology will appear, leading eventu-
ally to lower emissions and less chance of dangerous chemical spills (Joly and 
Bandelier, 1988). Industry in Europe will continue to be located near the raw 
material sources (Nordic countries and Central Europe) and the markets. 
{i) Steel and basic metals industries 
• Declining markets in Europe, strong international competition , nar-
row markets of specialized steels and more diversification of products. 
• A production capacity of about 70% of that of today in the year 2005; 
the decline in the labour force may be even greater. 
• Increased consortia and collaboration. 
• Increased automation, more efficient use of raw materials and prod-
ucts and recycling of old products . 
{ii) Chemical industry 
• Increasing diversification into many products such as fine chemicals. 
• Severe international competition. 
• Greater efficiency, more recycling and more automated control result-
ing in less use of energy and raw materials and less emissions to the 
environment. 
• A declining labour force . 
{iii} Manufacturing industries 
• Growth and an increase in the associated labour force. 
~ Products becoming more complex, diversified and customized. Euro-
pean industry will move towards specialized and knowledge-based 
products. 
• Technology-oriented services such as design, planning, engineering 
and project delivery continuing to play an important role in Europe. 
• Increasing automation , laser tooling , and utilization of information 
technology . 
• Subcontracting networks and collaboration growing in importance. 
• Replacement of steel by alloys, ceramics and high-strength plastics. 
This will change the nature of pollutant emissions to the environment. 
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(b) Transportation 
• Increasing number of kilometres per day per person despite the fact that 
electronic information transfer is also increasing rapidly. This is because 
personal mobility wm increase with increasing income, a more spread-out 
living style and a decrease in the cost of travel relative to income. (The 
increased personal mobility will be accomplished for short distances by 
automobiles and for longer distances by air travel.} 
• Declining slow-transportation freight modes (rail and ship), losing some of 
the market to shipment by truck and air. 
• Increasing air shipment of high value goods such as electronic equipment , 
precision machinery and luxury automobiles because of the lower risk of 
damage and the shorter time during which inventory is tied up. 
• A 4% increase per year in international freight transport in Europe. 
• Insufficient petroleum to supply the transportation demand after the year 
2030, and not enough natural gas after the year 2060. This means that 
hydrogen from, for example, hydrolysis of sea water may have to be used. 
Some not-impossible turning points include the following: 
(a) Industry 
Pronounced deviations from the conventional scenarios could occur because of 
environmental breakpoints such as climatic change, or economic or political 
disasters such as depressions or wars. See also Section 3.1. 
{b) Transportation 
• An increase in the use of low quality gasoline (because of a shortage of 
higher quality hydrocarbons}, resulting in an increase in emissions of air 
pollutants. 
• A deliberate policy to reduce road usage and air transport because of the 
necessity to reduce pollution. This might be brought about by having 
heavy taxation on fuel, direct user restrictions or by a concerted rejuvena-
tion of rail systems. 
• A sudden interruption in the energy supply for transportation or a large 
reduction in international trade due to conflicts or protectionism, resulting 
in a large reduction in pollution emissions. 
3.5. Agriculture 
Arable land, used for growing annual or permanent crops, currently covers about 
a third of Europe. An annual increase in productivity of 1 % is assumed for grow-
ing cereal crops until the year 2000 and 0.5% for the period 2000-2030, being an 
extrapolation of present trends (De Wit et al., 1987; Wong, 1986). Table S.4 
summarizes the resulting major trends for cereal crops. 
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Table 9... Plausible agricultural development of Europe for the period 1980-2030 in 
terms of the amount of land (in million ha), the total production (in million tonnes), as 
well as yield (in tonnes/ha). 
1980 2000 2090 
Region Land Prod. Yield Land Prod. Yield Land Prod. Yield 
Nordic1 3 10 3.3 2 9 4.5 2 10 5.0 
EEC-92 27 120 4.5 18 98 . 5.4 13 82 6.3 
Central3 1 5 4.5 1 6 5.5 1 6 5.8 
South4 15 42 2.8 14 46 3.3 11 44 4.0 
Eastern5 84 189 2.3 68 200 3.0 60 216 3.6 
Europe 130 366 2.8 103 359 3.5 87 378 4.2 
1Finland, Norway, Sweden. ~Belgium , Luxembourg, Denmark, France, FRG, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, UK. 
Austria., Switzerland. 
: Albania., Greece, Portugal, Spa.in, Yugoslavia.. 
Bulgaria., Czechoslovakia., GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania. and the European pa.rt of the 
USSR. 
In total some 40 million ha of agricultural land are expected to be taken out 
of production, corresponding to about 30% of the current land used for growing 
cereal crops. The largest decrease in land used for agriculture is in the EEC, 
where about half of the agricultural land might be set aside for non-agricultural 
purposes. The increases in productivity and in areas taken out of production 
will lead to a decrease in the size of the labour force. [In the Netherlands, the 
decrease is estimated to be about 2.5% in the next 20 years (Nijkamp and Soete-
man, 1988).] 
Rapid advances in new technologies, notably biotechnology and informa-
tion technology, may lead to many unexpected transformations in European agri-
culture (Joly and Bandelier, 1988) . The annual growth rate of agricultural pro-
duction, now about 1 %, might double as a result of new technologies . Biotechnol-
ogy will lead to the emergence of new products (i) to control disease and to make 
crops resistant to pests and diseases, and (ii) to produce cultivars for harsh 
environments (e.g., salty soils and poor climatic conditions) (von Weizsacker, 
1986). The breeding of plants that are resistant to diseases or pests could result 
in a considerable reduction in the use of insecticides and pesticides. In addition, 
the improvements in biotechnology may result in growing crops that are able to 
fix nitrogen and therefore require less chemical fertilizers, which again provide 
opportunities to diminish nitrate pollution in water and air. 
The role of biotechnology for growing biomass energy has been assessed by 
Lewis (1986). By the year 2000, about 2.5 exajoule net biomass energy may be 
produced in EEC-9 plus part of the Nordic countries and Southern Europe. This 
would require about 14 million ha of land previously used for agriculture or 
forests. A wide application of information technology at the farm level may 
improve the management of pests, as well as conserve energy, water and land. 
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The resulting not-impossible turning points for European agriculture are 
summarized in Figures S.S and S.4 (Brouwer and Chadwick, 1988) as follows: 
• A further increase in productivity which could be as much as 2% per year 
(upper curve in Figure S.S). Such an increase in productivity may result in 
a further reduction of agricultural land when compared to the conventional 
scenario (lower curve in Figure s.4). 
• Adaptation to poor local conditions such as soil, water or climate (upper 
curve in Figure S.4). This could maintain the socioeconomic structure of 
rural areas, although it would further aggravate the current problems of 
agricultural surpluses. 
• Improvement of the environment, through the application of, among other 
possibilities, nitrogen fixing crops, integrated pest management and recy-
cling of agricultural waste. This approach can be promising in the highly 
productive agricultural lands of Europe. 
• Increasing monoculture, through wide application of clones, reducing 
























Figure 9.9. Agricultural scenarios for yields in Europe to the year 2030 : yields (1 = 
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Figure S.{ Agricultural scenarios for land use in Europe to the year 2030: land use (1 
= conventional wisdom; 2 = increase in productivity ; 3 = adaptation to poor local con-
ditions). 
3.6. Forestry* 
Figure 9.5 shows scenarios for annual final consumption of forest products 
(expressed in round-wood equivalents), net annual increment (N AI) of the Euro-
pean forests and annual fellings for Europe (ECE-F AO, 1986). Both NAI and 
annual fellings are expected to increase steadily, with the the gap between incre-
ment and fellings continuing to be substantial. This means that Europe will con-
tinue to have a rather large untapped wood supply which could be a driving 
force for increased wood processing capacity. There will be a steady increase in 
total demand for forest products. The strongest increase will occur in paper and 
wood products, with a modest growth in the demand for pulp. The demand for 
sawnwood and panels will stagnate or increase slightly. 
• This subsect ion WM contributed by S. Nilsson, Environment Program, IIASA. 
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Figure S.S. Scenarios for annual forest fellings, net annual increment of the forest , and 
annual final consumption of forest products in Europe (all in units of cubic metres per 
year) . The low scenarios are based "on modest, but realistic assumptions" while the high 
scenarios are based "on most expansive (but still realistic assumptions) ." (Source: 
ECE-F AO, 1986.) 
If the fellings and wood processing capacities in Europe do not increase, 
Europe will have to import increasingly large quantities of forest products from 
other continents. The pattern of raw-material input to industry will change in 
the future. Wood will be substituted by wastepaper, residues, fillers, etc. This 
will influence the future structure of industry. Based on these conditions for the 
scenario presented in Figure 9.5, industrial investments are likely to be concen-
trated on improving the competitiveness of existing capacities for sawnwood, 
panels and pulp. A rather strong expansion in wood processing capacity is fore-
seen for paper and board products (see also Kreysa, 1987; and Nilsson, 1988). 
The factors that could produce not-impossible turning points are mainly 
environmental rather than technological. They will be discussed in Section 4.6.1. 
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4. Environmental Futures for Europe 
4.1. Climate 
Climatic scenarios that might be expected in the year 2030 under slight climatic 
change are those of Lough et al. ( 1983), based on historical analogues*. The 
main features of the temperature scenarios shown in Figure 4.1 are the slight to 
moderate warming in summer, but in winter slight cooling in most of Europe 
and slight warming in other parts. Spring and autumn patterns {not shown) are 
similar to those in summer. 
An, important related statistic is the interannual variability in temperature. 
For winter (Figure 4.2), the numerical value of this statistic increases except in 
Italy, Greece and the Balkans. 
Scenarios for precipitation and interannual variability of precipitation are 
given in Figures 4.s and 4.4. There is a general tendency for drier summers and 
wetter winters. The patterns of interannual variability are rather complex but in 
general there is more variability in spring and autumn, with less in summer and 
winter. See, for example, the summer values in Figure 4.4. 
Comparable analogue scenarios for cloudiness indicate generally greater 
amounts of cloud by the year 2030 (Henderson-Sellers, 1986). 
Climatic scenarios for strong climatic change in the year 2030 are based on 
simulations obtained from the general circulation model of the British Meteoro-
logical Office {Mitchell, 1983) assuming that the equivalent concentration of car-
bon dioxide were double that of today: 
• Much higher temperatures, more than 4'C warmer in winter over Scandina-
via and northern USSR (Figure 4.5). 
• Increased precipitation over the northern half of Europe, and decrease over 
much of Southern Europe (Figure 4.6). 
A not-impossible turning point is based on the speculation of Broecker 
(1987): 
• Much colder temperatures due to the deflection of the Gulf Stream from 
Northern to Central Europe. 
• Lough et al. (1983) compared the mean temperature and precipitation patterns for the years 1934-1953 
with those for 1901-1920. Averaged over the Northern Hemisphere, these were the warmest and coolest 
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Figure ~.1. Expected changes of temperature in summer (upper) and winter (lower) (in 
·c) (Lough et al., 1983). Note that summers are generally warmer. Winters are slightly 
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Figure ..j .£. Expected changes in winter temperature variability (standard deviations) 
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Figure {9. Expected changes in precipitation in summer (upper) and winter (lower) as 
multiples of the standard deviation (Lough et al., 1983) . Note the tendency for drier 
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Figure ~·~ · Expected changes in the interannual variability of summer precipitation , 
cold period to warm period (Lough et a.l., 1983) . The changes generally are not large. 
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Figure ~.5. Temperature increases expected in summer (upper) and winter (lower) as a 
result of the equivalent doubling in concentration of C02 (in "C) (Mitchell , 1983). Note 
the considerable warming in all parts of Europe. 
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Figure ~ . 6 . Precipitation changes expected in summer (upper) and winter (lower) as a 
result of the equivalent doubling in concentration of C02 (in mm/day) (Mitchell, 1983) . 




4.2.1. Scenarios for sea level rise 
Climate warming will cause a global rise in sea level. The areas most at risk are 
estuaries with important industrial facilities and rich agricultural land (Hekstra, 
1988) . A widely accepted scenario for the extent of this rise is shown in Figure 
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Figure ../ . 7. Scenarios for global sea level rise (Jager, 1988). The chances that the actual 
sea level will fall below the upper, middle and lower scenarios are 90%, 50% and 10%, 
respectively. These are global values; local changes need to be evaluated individually. 
The resulting impacts are as follows : 
• Erosion of beaches and coastal margins. 
• Decrease of usable land. 
• Increase in frequency and severity of flooding of low-lying lands. 
• Loss of dunes and coastal wetlands. 
• Inland flood-plain penetration of saline waters, affecting agriculture and 
drinking water. 
• Resuspension of toxic materials from estuarine sediments. 
• Mobilization of toxic materials from waste dumps. 
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4.2.2. Plausible hydrological scenarios 
Based on the temperature and precipitation scenarios of Lough et al. (1983) , the 
hydrologic changes in Europe for the year 2030 are: 
Spring: More evapotranspiration; less precipitation; 
earlier spring snow-melt. 
Summer: Much more evapotranspiration; .Jess precipitation. 
Autumn: More evapotranspiration; more precipitation. 
Winter: Less evapotranspiration over most of Europe, but 
more in the Mediterranean countries; more precipitation. 
The net result would be a significant reduction in water availability in sum-
mer in soils, lakes and rivers , and a lesser reduction in spring. For autumn and 
winter , conditions would be rather similar to current ones. 
Some not-impossible hydrologic turning points are as follows: 
• A major increase in evapotranspiration during the summer half of the year 
(see, for example, Bultot et al., 1988) . 
• A substantial decrease in soil moisture, particularly in the summer, in Cen-
tral and Southern Europe (Manabe and Wetherald , 1987). 
• A reduction in river flows, particularly in the summer, in Central and 
Southern Europe. 
• Increased frequency of floods in Northern Europe (see for example, Olejnik, 
1988). 
• An increase in streamflow variability, particularly in Northern Europe. [An 
increase in variability is more serious than a decrease in mean flow 
(Kaczmarek and Kindler, 1988) .] 
• Earlier spring snow-melts in the Alps. [The summer snowline will rise 
about 180mj°C of warming (RIVM, 1988) .] 
• Glaciers and permafrost ultimately melting (RIVM, 1988). 
• An increase in the length of the ice-free season in lakes and seas. [The 
length of the ice-covered period in Finnish lakes would decrease by 40 to 60 
days (Kuusisto, 1988).] 
• An increase in the length of the navigation season in the Arctic Ocean. 
• Loss of the attractiveness of some of the favoured areas for winter sports. 
• Changed water circulation patterns in the Mediterranean Sea due to the 
changed water temperatures and wind fields, causing depletion of oxygen 
and changes in biological productivity (Zavatarelli, 1988). 
The hydrological scenarios and turning points given above suggest that 
water supplies could decrease over some areas of Europe during the next 30 to 50 
years, particularly over the southern half of the continent. However, water con-
sumption may not increase very much over this period if the price of water use 
increases. [Between 1970 and 1980, the price of water in the OECD countries 
increased by 100 to 200% (Theys, 1987).] Three countries (Belgium, Poland and 
GDR) are already facing water stress (with more than 500 people to be 
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Figure 4.8. Hydrologic shifts for various countries based on the British Meteorological 
Office COz-doubled general circulation model and UN population projections for the 
year 2025 (United Nations, 1986). (Source: Brouwer and Falkenmark, 1988.) 
supported on a flow of 1 million m3 water per year). These countries have a per 
capita level of annually available water that is in the range between 1,200 and 
1,600 m3. This is the amount of water potentially available for domestic and a 
multitude of agricultural and industrial purposes. Within a country, of course, 
local availability depends on access to reservoirs for flood flow storage, well sys-
tems, etc. There are also shortages during the growing season in some Mediter-
ranean countries. 
Figure ~.8* compares national changes in water availability and population 
for current levels and the year 2030, by which time strong climatic change is 
assumed to have occurred (see Figures ~.5 and ~.6). 
• It should be noted that this figure takes no account of water quality, which, if adversely affected, will be 
another limitation on water availability. For example, sea level rise (causing salt-water intrusion) could 
render much of the groundwater supplies in the coaatal lowlands unsuitable for human consumption. 
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Under this scenario countries suffering water stress by the year 2030 may 
include not only Belgium and Poland, but also Greece, Spain and Italy. Many 
other countries will find it necessary to improve their water management pro-
grams. Only Austria and the Scandinavian countries are expected to have water 
surpluses. 
4.3. Atmospheric Pollution and Regional Acidification 
(a) Emissions 
Scenarios for European emissions of sulphur oxides and, for comparison, carbon 
dioxide, are shown in Figures ..1.9 and ..1.10. The conventional wisdom energy 
scenario is that described in Section 3.3. Note that, despite the expected increase 
in production of energy during the next 50 years, the emissions of S02 and C02 
are not forecast to increase dramatically because of increased adoption of S02 
emission control technologies and an increased use of natural gas. 
The other curves in Figures ..1.9 and ..1.10 represent emissions resulting from 
the not-impossible turning points described in Section 3.3. 
• If nuclear power is replaced by coal, emissions of both 802 and C02 will 
increase [curves (a)]. 
• If after the year 2000, public resistance to nuclear power is overcome, the 
resulting increased use of nuclear . power would result in greatly reduced 
emissions of S02 and C02 [curves (b)J. 
• Increased use of natural gas from deep levels in the earth could replace 
both nuclear power and coal and would result in very great decreases in 
emissions of S02. The fractional decreases in C02 emissions would be less 
than that for S02 because natural gas still contains some carbon [curves (c)]. 
• If the energy system becomes primarily hydrogen based, emissions of both 
802 and C02 could greatly decrease [curves (d)J, provided that fuels used 
for the production of hydrogen do not contain sulphur or carbon. 
• Whatever the mix of fossil fuels, development of C02 capture technologies 
will reduce emissions of C02. 
• Breakthroughs in the efficiency of energy transmission and use would 
decrease the emissions shown in Figures ..1.9 and ..1.10 by as much as 20% in 
the year 2015 and by 40% in 2030. 
• Attaining a sustainable energy supply in Europe by the "hard solar" 
scenario referred to in Section 3.3 could result by 2100 in a decrease of 
about 40% in C02 emissions relative to the 1975-1980 period. The "soft 
solar" scenario would result in a decrease of over 60% in C02 emissions. In 
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Figure ,/ .9. Scenarios of sulphur emissions (in 106 tons/year) for Europe to the year 
2030. Conventional wisdom curve: based on scenario given in Table S.1 . Curve (a) : nu-
clear power replaced by coal. Curve (b): increased use of nuclear power. Curve (c): in-
creased use of natural gas from deep wells. Curve (d) : hydrogen based energy system. 
{b} Sulphur deposition 
The IIASA RAINS model (Alcamo et al., 1987) can be used to estimate sulphur 
deposition, given an emission field. Using this approach in the case of S02, Fig-
ures 4.11 and 4.12 show patterns of sulphur deposition in the year 2030, based 
on the hypotheses contained in Figure 4.9, curves (a) and (c/d). In the case of a 
move away from nuclear power to coal, the sulphur deposition flux exceeds lOg 
S/m2/year in Central Europe and lg S/m2/year over most of Europe. These 
values should be compared with the critical loads for sulphur for sensitive 
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Figure -1 .10. Scenarios of carbon dioxide emissions (in 106 tons/year) for Europe to the 
year 2030. Curve (a): nuclear power replaced by coal . Curve (b): increased use of nu-
clear power. Curve (c) : increased use of natural gas from deep wells. Curve (d) : hy-
drogen based energy system. 
1.5g S/m2 /year. It would appear that the critical loads will be exceeded over a 
large part of Europe. 
Figure ,+.12 shows that if the energy system were based more upon natural 
gas or hydrogen (the latter produced without the combustion of sulphur-
containing fuels), the maximum deposition flux would decrease to 3-4g 
S/m2 /year and the critical loads would be exceeded over a much smaller area 
than in (a) above.* 
• These projections do not take into account the effects of nitrogen depoeition, nor the fact tha.t receptor 
eeneitivitiee (a.nd, therefore, the critica.J loa.d) va.ry over Europe. Also, the wind a.nd precipitation fields 





















Figure {11 . Total sulphur deposition (g/m2 /year) for year 2030 for S02 emissions assuming nuclear power is replaced by coal, 




















Figure ,4 .11!. Total sulphur deposition (g/m2/ year) for year 2030 for S02 emissions assuming increased use of natural gas from deep 
wells, or a hydrogen based energy system, curves (c/d) in Figure {9. Critical loads would be exceeded over a much smaller area 




Surface ozone concentrations have been rising in Europe over the last two 
decades and will continue to increase (Feister and Warmbt, 1987; Darrnstadter 
et al., 1987). As summers become drier and warmer, the use of air conditioning 
equipment may increase, driving up the consumption of energy and the emission 
of oxides of nitrogen. Summertime episodes of high ozone concentrations will 
become more frequent and more intense (Darmstadter et al., 1987). In fact, 
these not-impossible projections are as follows: 
Actual values Projections 
Year 1890 1920 1950 1980 2030 2080 
03, (ppb) 10 20 35 55 130-180 130 
These projections are supported by some model simulations of Briihl and 
Crutzen (1988), who suggest that present average tropospheric ozone concentra-
tions in the Northern Hemisphere could double by the middle of the 21st cen-
tury. 
4.4. Soil Quality 
4.4.1. Acidification (depletion of soil buffering capacity) 
The forest soil submode! of RAINS takes into account geographical variations in 
sensitivity to acidity. Figures 4.19 and 4.14 show comparisons of forest soil aci-
dity in 2030 in six countries of Central Europe for emission curves a and c/ d of 
Figure 4.9. The figures are in the form of histograms of percentage area with pH 
within the specified ranges for each country and for the six countries combined 
(to the right of the map). The histograms are heavily shaded for the "conven-
tional wisdom" scenario and more lightly shaded for the others. 
By 2030, the "conventional wisdom" scenario will result in 35% of the 
forest soils in the six countries having a pH value of less than 4.0, 50% between 
4.0 and 4.3 an<l 10% between 4.3 and 4.5. The greatest fraction of forest soils 
with pH less than 4.0 will be in the GDR (75%) followed by Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia and Austria (45-50%). . 
Turning point scenario (a), in which nuclear power is phased out, will 
result in a slight increase in the area of forest soil with pH less than 4.0 (from 
35% to 40% in the six countries), a corresponding decrease in the area with pH 
between 4.0 and 4.3 and little change in that with pH between 4.3 and 4.5 (Fig-
ure 4.19) . Little change is expected in Austria and Czechoslovakia. 
If the energy system were to be based upon natural gas or hydrogen (emis-
sion turning point scenarios (c) and (d)), the change would be more pronounced 
(Figure 4.14). Note that in Figure 4.14, the ranges of pHs have been shifted 
upward from those in Figure 4.19 to accommodate this improvement. In the six 
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Figure ,/ .19. Percentage area of forest soils in Central Europe in the year 2030 within the specified pH ranges, as predicted by the 
IIASA RAINS model for two scenarios: The darker histograms show the distribution assuming the "conventional wisdom" scenario 
while the lighter histograms assume that nuclear energy will be replaced by coal. Histograms are shown for individual countries; the 
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Figure 4 .14. As in Figure 4 .19, except that the lighter histograms represent the distributions assuming an increased use of natural 
gas or hydrogen for the production of energy . Note that because of the large improvement associated with this scenario, the histo-
grams are shifted to higher ranges from those in Figure 4.19. VJ VJ 
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countries, the percentage area of forest soil with pH less than 4.0 would drop 
from 35 to 15% while the percentage area between pH 4.0 and 4.3 would increase 
from 50 to 70%. Large changes would occur in all countries but Austria. 
4.4.2. The accumulation and future releases of toxic materials 
Various toxic materials may accumulate in soils. Their sources are manifold, 
e.g., industrial emissions, combustion of fossil fuels, dissipative end uses of some 
consumer products (e.g., asbestos in insulation and automobile brakes, lead in 
gasoline), corrosion of urban structures, composting with contaminated sludge, 
leaching from garbage dumps, incineration of solid wastes containing these 
materials. 
Accumulation in agricultural soils is of major concern because of the possi-
bility of uptakes of these materials in crops. For example, cadmium inputs, in 
addition to the sources listed above, occur as a trace impurity during the appli-
cation of phosphate fertilizers. Although current concentrations of cadmium in 
crops in Europe appear to be well below levels considered safe for human con-
sumption (except for local hot spots) accumulations over future decades may 
raise concentrations above safe levels. Calculated projections of daily intakes of 
cadmium in the European Community over the next 100 years highlight the 
potential seriousness of the problem, Table 4.1 (Hutton, 1982). 
Table ~ . 1. Current and future dietary intakes (µg/day) in the UK and Denmark for two 













These predicted intake levels are average values: accordingly, intake for 
some proportion of the population in the EC could exceed the tolerable intakes 
(57 to 71 µg/day) recommended by the WHO. 
When heavy metals are present in a mobilizable form, their danger to the 
biosphere is magnified many times. One of the major factors affecting mobility is 
acidific;ation. The concern is that as soils acidify, their capacity to absorb toxic 
heavy metals such as cadmium and mercury is greatly diminished, and the 
increased mobility of these metals leads to uptake by plants or leaching into local 
water courses. In addition to metals from anthropogenic sources , naturally 
occurring metals such as aluminum begin to leach from soils acidified to levels of 
4.0 to 4.3. 
In agricultural soils, a major cause of acidification is nitrogen fertilizer in 
the form of ammonium. The tendency for agricultural soils to acidify is con-
trolled by the addition of lime, which keeps soil at around 6.0. A potential turn-
ing point is the abandonment of marginal farm land in the coming decades, 
which in Western Europe could amount to around 20% of the total of current 
agricultural lands. Upon the cessation of liming, these lands may acidify rapidly 
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(Stigliani, 1988). Since some of these areas have received high inputs of heavy 
metals, a drop in pH, to perhaps 5 for clay soils and 4 to 4.5 for sandy soils, may 
cause discharges of heavy metals, pesticides and other toxic materials into 
ground and surface waters. 
4.4.3. Phosphorus saturation of farmlands 
Unlike nitrogen fertilizer which is leached from soils relatively quickly, phos-
phorus is stored for a long time until saturation occurs. At that point, additional 
phosphorus inputs will result in its rapid leaching into ground and surface 
waters. There is therefore, a potentially serious turning point for parts of Europe 
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Figure ~.15. Projected changes of phosphorus content of soils from 1950 to 2080 in Den-
mark (DK), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), and the Netherlands (NL) . The right-hand scale shows the depth of saturation 
assuming a phosphorus sorption capacity of 30 kg P /ha/cm. Estimates were based on 
the assumption that phosphorus application in future would be the same as for the 
period 1980 to 1985. (Source: Behrendt, 1988.) 
Figure +.15 shows historical trends and plausible scenarios for the phos-
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Figure .{16. Long-term extension of the area of phosphate-saturated maize land in the 
Netherlands for four scenarios of phosphate application. (Source: Breeuwsma and 
Schoumans, 1987.) 
phosphorus application rates are assumed to continue (Behrendt, 1988). 
Currently, most European soils are not phosphate-saturated, the main exception 
being some 20,000 ha of farmland in the Netherlands, where large quantities of 
manure are applied (see Figure ~.16). However, over a time scale of decades to a 
century, the top 1 to 2 metres of agricultural soils in these countries could 
become saturated. 
Once phosphorus is released, eutrophication of streams and lakes becomes 
a real threat. (In 1984-1985, over 3.5 million tons of phosphorus were applied as 
fertilizers in Europe, as compared with 0.7 million tons as detergents.) The most 
vulnerable soils are those with low phosphorus adsorption capacities and high 
water tables. 
The phosphorus cycle of forest ecosystems is currently well balanced, so a 
conversion of farm land to forest would be advantageous for soils vulnerable to 
phosphate leaching. However, if crop yields in the remaining farm land were to 
be increased to maintain overall agricultural productivity, increased inputs of 
phosphorus may result, leading to even more rapid saturation (Behrendt, 1988). 
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Figure ~ .17. Salt-affected soils and potential soil salinity as consequence of extended ir-
rigation (Szabolcs, 1988) . 
4.4.4. Soil salinization 
Soil salinity results in a decrease in agricultural productivity. More than three 
quarters of the salt-affected soils in Europe occur in Hungary, Spain and the 
USSR, but parts of Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Romania 
and Yugoslavia are also affected. Soil salinity is closely related to the salinity of 
groundwater, thus causing a problem for irrigation and drinking water. In 
theory, soil salinization can be prevented through appropriate water manage-
ment techniques. However, if such measures are not taken in Europe, some not-
impossib/e turning points for salinization are: 
(1) Soil salinization of some fertile agricultural areas around the river basins of 
the Danube, Brut, Dnieper, Don and Volga (Figure 4.17) if there is further 
extension of irrigation in these regions with semi-arid climatic conditions. 
(2) An extension of soil salinity in the Mediterranean region into the river 
basins of the Tejo, Ebro, Po and Rhone (Figure 4.18) due to warmer and 
drier summers and increasing use of irrigation. 
(3) Intrusion of salt water into groundwater in the coastal lowlands of 
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Figure .4.18. Salt-affected soils and potential salinity as consequence of climatic change (Szabolcs, 1988). 
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Figure +.19. Salt-affected soils and potential salinity as consequence of sea level rise 
(Szabolcs, 1988). 
4.4.5. Soil erosion 
{a) Northwest Europe 
The loess soils of cultivated land in Northwest Europe are highly vulnerable to 
erosion, the magnitude and frequency of rainfall events between April and 
August being critical. However, although climatic change may result in increased 
rainfall, as shown in Figure 4.6, the tendency toward increased erosion may be 
offset by a longer period of protective vegetative cover (due to a longer growing 
season), and more active soil fauna which will help to maintain the integrity of 
the soils . Hence, the extent of soil erosion is not expected to increase 
significantly from climatic changes. Furthermore, soil erosion may be controlled 
by conservation and minimum tillage (De Ploey, 1988) as well as by crop rota-
tion systems. Also new technologies are being developed to improve the physical 
properties of the soils by synthetic polymers (Imeson, 1988). 
{b) The Mediterranean Region 
In the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, there is potential for an 
increase in erosion due to climatic change, mainly because soil structure in this 
region is more easily destabilized than in Northwest Europe. The extent of soil 
erosion might increase here either directly by a decrease in organic matter levels 
or indirectly through changes in vegetation and land use (such as cultivation of 
land on slopes or after the occurrence of forest fires). 
{c) The Alpine Region 
Soil erosion occurs in Alpine regions, causing landslides and mudslides. With 
increased recreational use, and forest decline due to air pollution and climate 
warming, a plausible scenario is that soil erosion problems will intensify. 
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4.5. Water Quality 
4.5.1. Acidification of lakes in Fennoscandia 
Using the IIASA RAINS model for given sulphur emission scenarios, the percent-
age of lakes in each of several regions in Norway, Sweden and Finland, whose pH 
falls within specified ranges, can be estimated. The resulting distributions for 
turning point scenario (a) in Figure 4.9, in which nuclear power is phased out, 
are shown in Figure 4.20. As in Figures 4.19 and 4.14, the distributions are com-
pared with those from the "conventional wisdom" scenario. It can be seen that 
the model predicts changes of only a few percent in the distributions resulting 
from the relatively large changes (positive and negative) in the turning point 
scenario.* 
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Figure 4.20. RAINS model prediction of the percentage of lakes within Fennoscandia in 
the year 2030 within the specified pH ranges for two scenarios: the "conventional wis-
dom" scenario (dark histogram) and the phaseout of nuclear power (striped histogram) . 
Similarly small changes were found in the case of turning point (c/d) in 
Figure 4.9, in which the energy system is based upon natural gas or hydrogen 
(results not displayed) . Nevertheless, one may observe that about 10% of the 
• There a.re several poaaible reasons: (a.) The buffering ca.pa.cities of lake/watershed systems a.re a.lrea.dy so 
low tha.t future changes in deposition have little overall effect upon them. (b) The histograms emphasize 
the most sensitive lakes, i.e ., those with pH va.luee lees tha.n 5.3. It should also be noted tha.t currently the 
RAINS model does not treat acidification resulting from nitrogen deposition. 
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lakes would have a pH < 5.3. At these pH values alkalinity is not available in 
the lake to neutralize acidifying deposition. 
4.5.2. Eutrophication 
As indicated in Section 4.4.3, the area of farmland saturated with phosphorus 
may increase, posing a future eutrophication threat for ground and surface 
waters. 
Rates of eutrophication may increase with increasing temperatures (R. 
Wollast, Free University of Brussels, personal communication, 1986). The turn-
ing points for climate warming (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2) therefore imply that 
eutrophication rates may increase significantly. 
4.5.3. Anoxia and the accumulation and release of toxic materials 
in estuaries and coastal areas 
Overfertilization of coastal waters is already causing episodes of oxygen deple-
tion, fish suffocation and H2S generation; see, for example, Schroder (1985). 
Particularly in the Baltic and Adriatic Seas, these episodes are expected to 
become more frequent due to greater runoff of nutrients from increasing use of 
fertilizers, and in the Adriatic and Black Seas due to increasingly inadequate 
sewage systems as a result of the rising numbers of tourists in coastal resorts. 
The sediments of many European rivers, estuaries and coastal waters are 
already contaminated with heavy metals and other toxic materials. A plausible 
scenario for the next 50 years is that toxic discharges into these water bodies will 
decline. Nevertheless, the sediments have the potential to release the toxic 
materials accumulated over past decades. Under conditions of anoxia, the mobil-
ization of certain toxic materials is · repressed: as the oxygen levels in the water 
increase, these materials may become more water-soluble (Stigliani, 1988). 
Thus, ironically, a reduction of runoff from nitrate fertilizers, and an improve-
ment of sewage treatment (both of which tend to increase the oxygen supply of 
receiving waters), may trigger a release of these metals, causing a new wave of 
toxic effects. The effects may be amplified by sea level rise, if this phenomenon 
is accompanied by mechanical disturbance of the sediments. 
4.5.4. Changes in wetlands 
Freshwater wetlands serve an important role in the cycling of major chemical 
pollutants such as sulphate, nitrate, and toxic materials. Because they provide 
an anoxic medium, they may chemically transform chemicals that flow through 
them. Riparian wetlands serve to buffer adjacent rivers from nitrogen runoff 
from agricultural activities (Pinay and DeCamps, 1988). In areas of high atmo-
spheric sulphur deposition, wetlands also store sulphur as insoluble sulphides. 
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Important turning points for wetlands are associated with climatic turning 
points, viz., an increase in temperature throughout Europe, an increase in pre-
cipitation in Northern Europe and a decrease in Southern Europe, and a rise in 
sea level. These changes would lead to: 
• A drying out of freshwater wetlands in Southern Europe. Rivers previously 
protected by adjacent wetlands would experience a new wave of nitrate 
inputs; stored sulphur would also be released, causing new episodes of sul-
phuric acid leaching (Stigliani, 1988). 
• Creation of brackish wetlands in coastal zones. These wetlands may, in 
fact, protect coastal marine environments somewhat by effectively storing 
heavy metals and other toxic materials as insoluble sulphide precipitates. 
However, if these areas are reclaimed through drainage works and the con-
struction of dikes, there is likely to be a release of the stored materials as 
the lands become oxygenated. 
4.6. Biota 
4.6.1. Forests• 
Plausible scenarios for net annual increment (NAI) and annual fellings for the 
forests of Europe were presented in Figure S.5. Here we look at factors that 
could send these variables on quite different paths . . These factors include: 
(a) Forest dieback mainly due to air pollution (Figure 4.21). The annual 
decline in forest volume in many European countries may eventually exceed 
the annual fellings by 5 to 10 times (Nilsson and Duinker, 1987). 
(b) Extinction of the boreal forest due to rapid climate warming (Jager, 1988). 
(c) Breakthroughs in genetics and tree breeding (Figure 4.22). 
( d) Increased demand for recreation and protection forests (Figure 4. 29) . 
(e) Large-scale conversion of agricultural land to forests (Figure 4.24) . 
(f) Significant increases in processing capacity in the pulp-and-paper industry 
(Figure 4.25). 
The resulting not-impossible turning points shown in Figures 4.21 to 4.25 
are as follows: 
• A European wood-supply shortage developing over the long term, as a 
result of forest decline and increased demand for non-wood forest uses 
(recreation and environmental protection). 
• The wood-supply shortage being resolved or postponed by 20-50 years, due 
to large-scale conversion of agricultural land, genetic breakthroughs and/or 
substitution of non-wood materials. 
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Figure i. 21. Turning points for annual forest fellings and net annual increments result-
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Figure i .22. Turning points for annual forest fellings and net annual increments result-
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Figure . {29. Turning points for annual forest fellings and net annual increments result-
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Figure ,+.25. Turning point for annual forest fellings resulting from significant increases 
in processing capacity in the pulp-and-paper industry . 
• A wood-supply shortage occurring as early as 2015, due to greatly increased 
demand for forest products and a collapse in overseas supplies of wood and 
wood products. 
These turning points have economic consequences, which in turn affect the 
state of the European forests. See Kornai (1988) for a description of a simulation 
model that could be used to explore the various policy dilemmas resulting from 
these turning points. 
4.6.2. Species diversity 
Species diversity has decreased in Europe over the last 50 years, and many 
species of flora and fauna are on endangered lists. Of the approximately 11,000 
vascular plant species in Europe, for example, 1400 were considered to be 
endangered in 1977, and 277 were believed to be especially vulnerable; by 1982, 
the number in the latter category had increased to 344 (ECE, 1988a). 
There are several reasons for this situation: 
• Loss and fragmentation of habitats . 
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• Environmental pollution, including acidic deposition and widespread use of 
pesticides and herbicides. 
• Invasion of competing species and biological pests. 
Climate change over the next 50 years will place additional stresses on 
biota. Some examples include (Anonymous, 1988; De Groot, 1988): 
• Sea level rise will cause drowning of many coastal marshes. 
• Shifting of natural vegetation zones, e.g., decline of the boreal forest, will 
lead to a loss of food and habitat for many species. 
• Major warming in the Arctic and Subarctic will significantly affect the 
hatching patterns and food supplies of Arctic shore birds. 
• Climate change will affect migration patterns and could favour biological 
invasions. (This might lead, for example, to increasing use of pesticides and 
herbicides.) 
• Species confined to nature reserves are likely to be particularly vulnerable 
to climate change. 
Scenarios and turning points for species diversity will not be given. This is 
because ecosystem models are not sufficiently advanced to provide simulations of 
changes in climate and other factors. Nevertheless, there is at least qualitative 
recognition that changes in species diversity will occur in the next 50 years, and 
that some of these changes might be profound and economically disruptive. 
4.7. Land Use 
Land use changes are caused by human activities, including socioeconomic and 
geopolitical development, and environmental factors. Environmental changes 
will have major implications for land use changes since they might set limits to 
resource use options or create new opportunities. 
Urbanization/ industrialization/ transportation 
No major changes are expected except in coastal lowlands of Europe which 
include great estuaries with important industrial ha!bours and rich agricultural 
land. These areas are at risk because of the projected sea level rise, which could 
lead to major restructuring of the urban fabric. 
Recreation 
Intensive year-round development of the coasts of the Mediterranean, as well as 
those of Portugal, the Bay of Biscay and the Black Sea are expected. Some 




(1) Technological changes: Technological advances, especially those associated 
with genetic engineering, are likely to result in the potential for large shifts 
in the critical limits for a whole range of crops currently used in European 
agriculture and horticulture, and to a lesser extent for forest crops as well, 
over the next decades; 
(2) Changes in policies: The level of agricultural subsidies (including the 
growth of biomass) will determine future land use patterns to a large 
extent. For example, under present levels of subsidization, there might be 
by the year 2000 a need for an additional 6-23 million ha of land for the 
EEC-10; on the other hand if all subsidies were withdrawn, there would be 
a surplus of about 35 million ha (Lee, 1988). 
(3) Climate changes: Land use boundaries are likely to shift in response to 
climatic change that imposes new geographical limits on plant growth, with 
a shift of 5-7' in a northerly direction. Figure ~.26 gives some indication of 
this for selected crops (Brouwer and Chadwick, 1988). The potential 
northern shift of the boundary for sugar beet, winter wheat, spring barley 
and potatoes could mean that approximately 18-20 million ha of present-
day forest land in Northern Europe (the northern boreal forest) could be 
cleared for the growth of some of these crops. In Southern Europe (Medi-
terranean area and bordering the Black Sea) it would most probably no 
longer be feasible to grow perennial tree crop products (citrus fruits and 
olives) successfully and a switch would take place to such crops as cotton 
(and possibly rice) under irrigation. This is due to a limitation on crop 
growth in parts of the Mediterranean with the southerly boundary shifting 
3-5' N. Between these two extremes, significant shifts in cropping regimes 
would be possible. Also to be mentioned are the loss of rich agricultural 
land that would result from a rise in sea level, and a shift of alpine agricul-
ture from pasture to the growth of crops such as vegetables, fruits , wine 
and tobacco (Hekstra, 1988). 
(4) Changes in farming practice: In the future land use for agricultural pur-
poses may be affected by more stringent regulations to reduce the leaching 
losses of nutrients and pesticides to ground and surface waters. In princi-
ple there are three options, i.e., (i) decrease the intensity of chemical 
inputs, (ii) change the use of land by different cropping systems such as a 
crop rotation with cereal growth, leaving ploughed land unsown, and (iii) 
establish special restrictions on using chemical fertilizers and pesticides by 
policy instruments (such as taxes). Brink (1988) has concluded that a 
decrease in the intensity of land use would be most favourable for reducing 
leaching. 
(5) Net changes: As a not-impossible turning point, less intensive agricultural 
activities will result in reduced yields . In order to maintain overall produc-
tion, more land would be needed to compensate for reduced yields per hect-
are. As another turning point, climate warming could lead to clearance of 
large tracts of land not currently devoted to agriculture, to enable new crop 
varieties to be exploited. More likely, however, net agricultural land use 
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Figure ,4 .£6. Northern cropping boundaries in Europe for 1975 (Andreae, 1981) and 
2075. Note the northward shifts of these boundaries. 
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changes will be small due to over-production with respect to demand. 
Another factor working against an expansion of agricultural land will be 
the development of new crop varieties allowing yields per unit hectare to 
continue to increase. 
4.8. Internal Consistency Amongst Scenarios 
The scenarios and turning points described in Sections 3 and 4 are reasonably 
consistent with one another. Without attempting to demonstrate this in detail, 
it may nevertheless be useful to mention some of the most important interac-
tions. These are of two types: 
(a) Those resulting from changes initiated globally (e.g., increases in global 
C02 or methane emissions) leading to global environmental changes (e.g., 
in climate or sea level) causing European environmental, geopolitical and 
socioeconomic changes. 
(b) Those initiated in Europe (e.g., changes in sulphur or NOx emissions) lead-
ing to European environmental, geopolitical and socioeconomic changes. 
As an example of Type (a), turning point scenarios for climate warming 
would lead to: 
• A decrease in heating degree days and of winter energy consumption . 
• An increase in summer air conditioning demands, and of summer energy 
consumption. 
• An increase in summer evapotranspiration, reducing river flows and caus-
ing impacts on hydroelectric power production, inland navigation, water 
quality and industrial water supplies. 
• Longer ice-free summers in northern seas, lakes and rivers. 
• Longer growing seasons in northern regions. 
• An increase in eutrophication of water bodies. 
• A drying up of freshwater wetlands in Southern Europe, causing a new 
wave of nitrate inputs to adjacent rivers; also causing sulphuric acid leach-
mg. 
As an example of Type (b), the turning point scenarios for sulphur deposi-
tion in the case of a move away from nuclear power would lead to: 
• An increase in the areal extent of regions where target loadings are 
exceeded. 
• An increase in the areal extent of forest decline. 
• An increase in the number of acidified lakes and rivers. 
• Realization of the not-impossible turning points in Figure ... 21 concerning 
net annual increment and annual fellings for the forests of Europe. 
• A reduction in species diversity in currently forested areas in Europe and in 
acidified lakes. 
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5. Policy Dilemmas and Policy Exercises 
5.1. Policy Dilemmas 
Environmental problems are intimately linked to socioeconomic activities, and 
solutions involve complex trade-offs between economic, social, and scientific con-
siderations. Often there are no easy solutions, and policy makers are confronted 
with the dilemma of choosing from a set of policy options, none of which is 
appealing for a number of reasons, e.g., high scientific uncertainty, high-stake 
economic and political risks, potential for social upheaval. Below are some 
dilemmas of importance in strategic planning for the long-term ecological and 
economic sustainability of Europe. They are based on discussions with senior 
European policy advisors and environmental scientists participating in our vari-
ous workshops. 
5.1.1. Managing water resources in an era of climatic change 
Typically, water management policies consider foreseeable consumption changes 
but assume that the climate, although undergoing considerable year-to-year vari-
ation, will not change over the long term. In the construction of new reservoirs, 
for example, it is assumed that basin precipitation over the last 30 years is 
representative of future conditions. However, how would a significant change in 
water availability affect such policies? ·The question is problematic because 
scientists cannot estimate with any degree of precision, how global climatic 
change will affect water availability at the water basin scale. Yet reservoirs, 
dams, municipal water works and flood-control systems are built to last at least 
50 years . In our scenarios, water shortfalls are hypothesized to develop in Cen-
tral and Southern Europe, with water surpluses in Scandinavia; see Section 4.2.2. 
The dilemma is therefore whether, and in what ways, to introduce long-
term policies containing costly safety factors, given the uncertainties in current 
projections of water availability. 
5.1.2. The acidification of soils and lakes in Europe 
As discussed in Section 4.4 .1, even considering the planned reductions in emis-
sions of sulphur dioxide in Europe by 1993, Central Europe will still be 
threatened by widespread and continuing soil acidification. By 2030, about 40% 
of the forest soils in this region could have pH values less than 4 (Alcamo et al., 
1987). In such a scenario, these soils would no longer support productive forests 
and lakes. 
The solution to this crisis is to reduce emissions even more than planned, 
and this would require intergovernmental action. But large emissions in some 
countries, primarily in Eastern Europe, cannot reasonably be expected to 
decrease substantially in the next 30 years unless there is a substantial transfer 
of funds from Wes tern to Eastern Europe for this purpose, or if there is a change 
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in the industrial structure of Eastern Europe. Another option is to increase 
energy efficiency dramatically, but efforts to implement this strategy in the past 
have largely failed. A final option would be to switch from fossil fuel to nuclear 
power. In a post-Chernobyl world, this option may no longer be viable. The 
dilemma then is to find a mix of acceptable options, given the technological , 
economic and political'constraints involved. 
5.1.3. Long-term forestry management and the possibility of a 
shortfall in the wood supply 
There is currently an oversupply of harvestable wood in Europe. Even with this 
relative abundance, Europe imports 30% of its wood to fulfill demand. But some 
possible combination of factors may cause a severe wood shortage. The current 
over-supply is expected to peak around 2010. During the same period the Euro-
pean demand for paper pulp is expected to increase by 150%. In order to meet 
its demand, Europe may have to import even more wood than in previous 
decades . But working against this need could be a drastic reduction, on a global 
scale, of harvestable wood owing to an unprecedented trend in global deforesta-
tion, especially in the developing countries. This situation may lead to a critical 
global shortage by the year 2030. If Europe wishes to be self-sufficient by that 
time, a decision to plant new forests will have to be made in the next decade or 
so. Extra land may have to be set aside for forest plantations , and decisions will 
have to be made about which lands should be designated for this purpose. More-
over, future productivity of European forests is already quite uncertain, since (as 
discussed in Section 4.6.1) forest decline may continue. 
The problem here is somewhat similar to that of water resources . It is 
difficult to mobilize the key institutional , private and public-sector actors 
required to implement a long-term forest resources policy at a time when there is 
no current crisis , and where there is uncertainty about future wood supplies. 
5.1.4. Areas of Europe marginalized by mainstream economic 
and agricultural development 
In general terms, changing patterns of economic development in Europe leave 
some areas economically deprived. Such a situation is currently occurring in two 
economic sectors - marginal agricultural areas and former centres of heavy 
industry. The emerging problem is that while productive areas provide a source 
of tax revenues, some of which may be used for the maintenance of the land, 
abandoned lands provide no such revenues, and outside sources of funding will 
have to be allocated to maintain them. A less expensive option is simply to 
neglect the lands. For the latter choice, however, potentially serious environ-
mental problems may arise. 
In the EC countries, there are current discussions for reducing farm lands 
by as much as 20%. However, the soils in these abandoned lands will experience 
large chemical changes, owing to the cessation of large man-made inputs of 
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fertilizers, lime, and pesticides. This change could cause large perturbations in 
the environment including the leaching of toxic materials, and changes in the 
flow of nutrients to water bodies (Stigliani, 1988). Other problems could occur, 
including the disappearance of landscapes (important for the tourist industry), 
and increased risks of landslides, avalanches and floods. 
Regarding the abandonment of heavy industry, as noted in a recent EC 
study (Haines and Joyce, 1987), future plant closures may constitute major 
sources of land contamination, as old plants with large stores of buried toxic 
materials are left unattended. 
5.1.5. Coastal problems 
An environmental change that may have a very great impact on European coast-
al areas is a significant sea level rise, say of approximately 0.5 to I.Om. Although 
the time-horizon of sea level rise may be relatively long term, perhaps half a cen-
tury or more, the dilemma to policy makers will occur over the short term. Most 
elements of urban systems - dikes, buildings, roads, toxic waste dumps, sewage 
systems, etc. - are renewed or replaced on a timescale of decades to a century. 
This means that current planning decisions may affect the development of coa-
stal cities for decades into the future. The question is whether these decisions 
should take potential sea level rise into account? 
This problem may be most severe along the Mediterranean coast, because 
of potentially large increases in population. Beginning in 1992 among the EC 
countries , national borders are expected to become more open and citizens may 
be allowed to resettle without restriction. Thus, for example, retired people from 
Northern Europe may move to the Mediterranean area. In addition, tourism 
may expand owing to large numbers of retirees, increased life expectancy, and 
more leisure time because of a shorter work week. 
Whereas the problem of sea level rise is on the timescale of several decades 
or more, other kinds of environmental degradation may occur over the short 
term. The question is whether coastal areas have, or will have, adequate facili-
ties to accommodate large increases in population? If not, there could be rapid 
environmental degradation. Already on the Adriatic coast and elsewhere in 
Southern Europe, untreated sewage discharged directly into the sea during the 
summer tourist season is one of the most serious local environmental problems. 
Towns with say 20,000 inhabitants in the winter, may have 50,000 inhabitants in 
the summer, and existing sewage treatment facilities are inadequate. Construc-
tion of sewage treatment plants is expensive, and many areas of the Mediter-
ranean have lagged behind the rest of Europe in making the necessary invest-
ments. Other requirements for accommodating the increased populations such as 
roads, and adequate land-fill space for solid waste disposal may also be lacking. 
Although large coastal cities may have a significant tax base and an in-
place institutional apparatus for implementing protective measures, smaller 
towns with recently expanded populations may not have sufficient resources. 
Losses in property damage and costs of new or expanded pollution treatment 
facilities may devastate local economies. 
53 
Here again there is a problem of tradeoffs between very costly protective 
measures versus the even more costly impacts that might ensue, taking account 
of the uncertainty in future projections. 
5.1.6. Toxic materials build-up: the potential for chemical time bombs 
There are many possibilities in the environment for the accumulation and sud-
den release of harmful man-made chemicals. Moreover, such releases may come 
as surprises to the public and policy makers alike, and by the time that they are 
recognized, it may be too late to avoid much of the damage. Ideally, what is 
needed are long-term, broad-scale research, testing, and monitoring programs for 
identifying potentially harmful chemicals and anticipating their potential accu-
mulations before they actually occur. Current strategies are usually inadequate 
since they are designed to examine and monitor chemicals whose sources are well 
known, e.g., nitrate, sulphate, etc. But there are chemicals present in the 
environment for which there is little available information on source strengths. 
Past experience has demonstrated that it has generally been very difficult to 
secure funding for long-term monitoring programs that focus on new chemical 
substances whose environmental pathways and toxicities are not well known. 
This dilemma is described in more detail in Section 5.3. 
5.1. 7. Non-point-source emissions of potentially toxic substances 
Studies of pollution sources in the Hudson river basin in the USA show that in 
recent years, pollution from urban and agricultural runoff outweigh emissions 
from point sources such as industrial plants and sewage treatment facilities 
(Ayres and Rod, 1986; Rohmann and Lilienthal, 1987). In fact, for the eleven 
toxic materials studied, the emissions from non-point sources were several orders 
of magnitude higher than from point sources in most cases. This probably 
reflects the effectiveness of environmental regulations in controlling industrial 
and other fixed-point emissions. 
If this trend is also emerging in Europe, an entire new strategy will need to 
be developed to cope with toxic materials. Many of the toxics are released dur-
ing use or disposal by the consumer, individually in very small quantities, but 
the cumulative long-term build-up may be large. This applies to packaging 
materials, lubricants, solvents, fiocculants, anti-freezes, detergents, soaps, 
bleaches and cleaning agents, dyes, paints and pigments, most paper, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and germicides, and so on. 
Emissions of potentially toxic substances from such materials are extremely 
difficult to regulate. A major problem is that with a few notable exceptions, a 
detailed book keeping of the flow of hazardous chemicals through the industrial 
economy is not available, especially after the products leave the production 
phase and enter the commercial and consumer-use phase (Ayres et al., 1989; 
Norberg-Bohm et al., 1988). Another problem is to develop an effective strategy 
for reducing emissions. Two possible approaches are the promotion of 
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alternative environmentally "friendly" products, and implementation of extensive 
recycling programs. 
5.1.8. Controlling global emissions of C02 
For global-scale issues, Europe is a comparatively small region. Can European 
societies adopt policies to influence global phenomena, or are they condemned to 
endure global change passively, only mitigating it when possible with adaptive 
policies? A global convention on greenhouse gases is one possibility. The his-
tory of conventions on acid rain and chlorofluorocarbon gases suggests that it 
takes about two decades to reach international consensus. Even if a convention 
to regulate C02 emissions were signed, say in the year 2010, it is not at all clear 
that the agreement would be effective for at least another 25-50 years, particu-
larly in the Third World. One dilemma then is how to speed up the global 
response to this urgent issue. Another dilemma is how to cope with climate 
change brought about by large increases in fossil fuel consumption in other con-
tinents, even if Europe has managed to reduce its emissions of C02. (There are 
of course other global issues such as stratospheric ozone depletion, which should 
also be considered.) 
5.1.9. Transportation needs versus air quality 
A large increase in passenger and freight travel, particularly for cars, trucks , and 
airplanes is expected in the coming decades.* Since by that time, however, sup-
p lies of clean oils may be relatively scarce, clean liquid fuels for transportation 
may be prohibitively expensive, and choices may have to be made between 
environmental concerns and meeting the demands for transport. Thus, emis-
sions from mobile sources may become the major source of air pollution , espe-
cially in the case of air travel, which may double in Europe within the next 30 
years . 
Even if abundant and relatively cheap liquid or gaseous fuels were to 
become available, the problem of NOx emiss ions as a by-product of high tem-
perature combustion may not be solved. Current models suggest that tropos-
pheric ozone resulting from NOx emissions by aircraft may increase considerably 
(Briihl and Crutzen, 1988) . 
Another option to alleviate the transportation problem is to use high speed 
hydrogen burning aircraft which fly in the stratosphere for intercontinental 
flights . However, a global fleet of such planes would emit large quantities of 
water vapor, the environmental effects of which are currently unknown. 
• It ha.s recently been estimated that there will be 36 million cara on Britieh roade in the year 2020, com-
pared with 21 million in 1988 (The Timee, November 9, 1988). 
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5.1.10. Urban and suburban land development 
In the future, the use of European land may become more socially, economically, 
and politically interdependent, resulting in more spatial and temporal integration 
than has occurred in the past. This trend may result in more broad-scale 
specification of land for certain uses. The problem is, however, that some land 
uses, which may be attractive from the standpoint of short-term economic gain, 
may be irreversible, at least on a time scale of three to four generations. Urbani-
zation is one such use. Suburban sprawl has occurred in the vicinity of all major 
European cities, often destroying fertile farm land and nature reserves. 
In contrast, some argue that in fairness to future generations, land use poli-
cies should foster the preservation of the environment, natural resources, and the 
multi-functionality of land. However desirable these goals might be, implemen-
tation of such a policy would require, in the next decades, a turning point in 
public support for the way societies use the land. Currently, there is probably 
not enough social acceptance for prohibiting lucrative land use activities that 
might impinge on the interests of future generations. 
5.1.11. Increasing summer demand for electricity, 
and the impact on air quality 
In North America as far north as New York State, energy consumption is greater 
in summer than in winter, because of the widespread use of air conditioners in 
offices, houses, automobiles, etc. This is not the case in Europe where peak 
energy loads occur in winter. However a not-impossible scenario is that: 
• European life styles will change and air conditioning will become socially 
important. 
• Demand for air conditioning will increase as climate warming causes an 
increase in the frequency and intensity of summer heat waves. 
• In addition, many citizens of Northern Europe will retire in the Mediter-
ranean area, where heat waves are more common than in their homelands . 
• Summer energy loads will increase during these heat waves leading to peaks 
in NOx emissions from power stations, and massive large-scale oxidant 
episodes, as well as an increase in the acidity of rain. 
With respect to policy formulation, this potential crisis could be prevented 
if measures are introduced soon. These measures could include more stringent 
NOx controls than currently envisaged on power stations, disincentives for buy-
ing air conditioners, and development for more energy efficient air conditioners . 
The dilemma is how to place this issue on the current environmental agenda for 
Europe. 
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5.2. Methods of FormulatDing Long-Term Environmental Policy 
There is general agreement trnat standard means for factoring scientific informa-
tion into long-term strategie:es for managing the environment are inadequate. 
One major problem with thfl' policy dilemmas described above is the huge infor-
mation gaps in scientific knro.wledge that currently preclude the development of 
rigorous, quantitative analJlBes for predicting environmental change. Moreover, 
for the information that is a-:ailable, we do not yet know how to use it optimally 
in the formulation of prudent policies that both protect the environment and 
foster economic developmemt. Another perhaps more fundamental problem is 
that currently, there is no esttablished mechanism by which scientists and senior 
policy people can exchange iideas on the long-term management of the environ-
ment in a way that produces .new, useful information. As a result, policy makers 
are often disappointed by tfile lack of "policy relevance" in much of the scientific 
research, and scientists are <dften discouraged because their research appears to 
have no impact on public pofficy. 
As noted by Brewer (1!!986), the two common means of science/policy syn-
thesis, "Blue Ribbon" panells and large-scale computer simulation models for 
environment-economic an~sis, although quite useful in some contexts, are less 
so for analyzing long-term,. lhroad-scale ecological changes. Blue Ribbon panels 
are particularly suited far .r:eaching consensus on complex but well-bounded 
scientific questions. How~r" the policy aspects, if any, are often overlooked or 
treated naively. 
Large-scale environmem'.t-economic models are . hindered by the sheer com-
plexity (and non-linearity}. emf real world phenomena. Wack (1985a,b) has noted 
that planning based on mati;hematical forecasts can be reasonably accurate dur-
ing relatively stable time periiods. But precisely for that reason, models fail when 
they are most needed: in am.ticipating fundamental changes that require a new 
way of thinking about amf :planning for the future. Another important point 
raised by Beck (1983) is thm;t the need for personal judgement is not eliminated 
by models. Indeed, if In<Jrfrels are used merely to provide "answers", then the 
decision maker has in effect. <abdicated much of his power to the model builders. 
Both Wack and Beck Jhave argued forcefully for a "scenario" approach to 
managing an uncertain futmre. They note that the role of scenarios is to enhance 
the decision makers' undms'tanding of the future by providing perceptions of 
several possible future enmonments against which decisions can be tested. The 
goal is not to predict the lfuiture, but rather to manage the present, learning to 
Jive with uncertainty, to fad.tor it into the decision process, and to build bridges 
between decision makers an@ ·scientists. 
Advocating such an ai;pproach in no way reduces the value of modelling. 
On the contrary, the compliexities of the real world are such that without some 
assistance in organizing thiis complexity, decision makers are increasingly help-
less and forced to make mcisions without any real idea of their consequences. 
The distinction, however, iii rthat the models must be judged not against the cri-
terion of how accurately tftrey can reveal actual future trajectories, but on how 
useful they are in enhanrinlg the knowledge and understanding of decision mak-
ers by exploring the dynamil:c consequences of some of the complex assumptions. 
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Scenarios and computer simulations are important building blocks in our 
approach to long-term policy formulation. But the central foundation is the so-
called policy-exercise, whose methodological framework has been developed 
within IIASA's Environment Program over the last three years (Brewer, 1986; 
Toth, 1986, 1988). The method utilizes alternative scenarios of possible future 
European environments as the centre-piece for structuring appropriate policy 
responses. Senior environmental scientists and policy makers are confronted 
with scenarios dealing with a specific environmental problem posed as a "policy 
dilemma". The full time-span of the scenarios is not revealed initially. Rather, 
the scenario is presented in "time slices" (say 2005, 2015, 2025). At each time, 
the participants are asked to describe policies for appropriate management of the 
environment. The suitability of the policies are then tested as the future events 
in the scenario unfold. In fact, the future evolves partly in response to the suc-
cession of policy moves made by the participants. Moreover, the participants are 
invited not only to participate in the exercise, but also, if they wish, to challenge 
the validity of the scenario presented. However, the challenger must then defend 
his or her vision of the future. Such interplay is encouraged to ensure that the 
scenarios challenge the decision maker's preconceived ideas about what will hap-
pen, and accordingly may teach managers to think in terms of an uncertain 
future. 
The objective of a policy exercise is not to develop a firm set of environ-
mental policies for the next 50 years but: 
(1) To sensitize policy makers to uncertainties due to natural and human fac-
tors and to alert them to the possibility that some of their current policies, 
· even though well intended, may lead to disastrous consequences over the 
long term. 
(2) To train policy people in how to use adaptive management strategies, 
which are continually updated as new information is received. 
(3) To convince policy people of the need for regular "policy exercises" with 
scientists, as a preferred method of setting environmental agendas and 
priorities. 
5.3. An Illustrative Example: Toxic Materials Build-Up -
the Potential for Chemical Time Bombs 
"Toxic Materials Build-Up - the Potential for Chemical Time Bombs" was one 
of the dilemmas investigated in IIASA's Policy Exercise Workshop, held on June 
17-18, 1988 in Baden, Austria.* The brief description of this dilemma given in 
Section 5.1.6 will be elaborated here to illustrate the usefulness of the policy 
exercise approach. 
• The authon1 are indebted to Prof. J.-P. Vanderborght, Free Univen1ity of Bruuela, for his auistance in 
preparing this simulation. 
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The goal of this particular exercise was to assess the effectiveness of current 
or new management strategies in protecting ecological systems from the build-up 
and surprising release of toxic materials. Methods were sought by which institu-
tions, technologies, and research and monitoring efforts could play a significant 
role in anticipating potential problems before they actually occur. 
The first part of the exercise was a simulation of the sudden releases of an 
unknown toxic chemical on three occasions, separated in time but linked by a 
common cause. Participants were asked to develop strategies for mitigating the 
effects of the chemical. The second part of the exercise was a critical evaluation 
of the strategies proposed during the simulation, and recommendation of other 
strategies that, in hindsight, may have been more effective. 
Initially, the exercise focused on a small geographical area, namely a coa-
stal region in the Po River basin, Italy. A specific setting was selected in order 
to provide realism and a tractable spatial scale. However, the conclusions drawn 
address the general question of chemical "time-bombs" and what to do about 
them. 
A panel of four participants tried to mimic the responses of local health 
authorities to these events. To begin, the year was 2020, and the panel was con-
fronted with a sudden and mysterious fish kill in a small estuarine tributary of 
the Po (designated hereafter as Event A). The Panel's first task was to develop 
an appropriate action plan. The effectiveness with which the proposed plan 
could provide early warning of further episodes was tested against a second 
episode, which occurred six years later and farther upstream (Event B) . In simi-
lar fashion the effectiveness of the second action plan was tested against a third 
episode occurring even farther away, in a large area north of the Black Sea 
(Event C). The simulation ended at this point. 
Table 5.1 provides relevant background information on the environmental 
conditions in the area prior to 2020. This information was provided to the Panel 
at the beginning of the exercise. Table 5.2 discusses the three episodes of toxic 
poisoning in 2020, 2026, and 2030. This information was made available to the 
Panel in sequence, and only after they had responded to the preceding event. 
Table 5.9 describes the causes of the three events. This information was not 
given to the Panel. Table 5.~ presents a summary of the Panel's responses to the 
events as they unfolded. 
As can be seen, the Panel's responses were not atypical and were not par-
ticula~ly effective. What actions should have been taken? This was the subject 
of lively discussion, which led to the following suggestions: 
(1) Better early warning monitoring systems (see Section 6 below, in which 
some of the proposals have been incorporated). 
(2) Historical reconstructions of episodes of chemical poisoning in other 
regions, including assessments of strategies that ought to have been 
adopted. 
(3) Particularly in the case of episodes that have some curious or unexplained 
features, detailed biogeochemical assessments (the problem may seem to go 
away - but it may reappear somewhere else at some future time) . 
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Table 5.1 . Hypothesized environmental conditions in the tributary of the Po River be-
fore event A. 
A major clean-up of the discharges to the tributary from point-source pollutants was 
accomplished by 2000, a.nd no episodes of fish kills ha.d been reported since then . 
Although continuous monitoring had not been conducted, water quality generally ap-
peared to have been excellent . Farming, the principal use of land in the basin of the 
tributary , ha.d remained a.t a constant level for decades, with no major changes in 
chemical inputs to the land. 
Table 5.2. Scenarios. 
Event A: 
Event B: 
Event C : 
Fish kills reported in small tributary of the Po near the 
Adriatic coast in June 2020. 
A second episode of fish kills covering a. more 
extended area. upstream of the first event occurred in 2026. 
A third and more extensive episode of fish kills 
occurred in 2030 in an extensive agricultural region in 
the USSR north of the Black Sea. 
Table S.S. Causes of the events: a not-impossible scenario. 
• A pesticide, XB-10, had been used for over two decades in all the affected regions. 
However, no environmental problems had occurred prior to 2020. The pesticide is 
highly toxic, but laboratory tests showed it to be immobilized in soils so that 
leaching to ground and surface waters did not occur . Its decomposition products 
are leached from soils , but these a.re not environmentally harmful. In 1995, XB-10 
was approved as "environmentally safe" under the EC Directive requiring pre-
market testing of new pesticides. 
• Although immobilized in soils under normal conditions, XB-10 is leached rapidly 
from salinized soils . The salt ions compete with the pesticide for absorption sites 
on soil particles, resulting in the desorption of the pesticide molecules and their 
leaching to aquatic systems. 
• Event A was caused by a series of severe coastal floods by which salt waters from 
the Adriatic Sea permeated into a.n agricultural area heavily contaminated by 
XB-10. The cause of the flooding was a slight rise in sea level in the Adriatic Sea.. 
• Event B was caused by more extensive sea level rise. Salinization was caused by 
direct flooding of the soils bordering the river and by salt water intrusion into 
groundwaters which were subsequently used for irrigation. 
• Event C was caused not by sea level rise, but by a great increase in irrigation for 
intensive agricultural production (see Figure {17). The groundwaters in this re-
gion are quite salty, and soils under heavy irrigation were susceptible to saliniza-
tion . 
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(1) River water, fish tissue and biological organisms analyzed . 
Results: 
(1) Unknown chemical agent found in fish tissue and plants . 
(2) Agent identified after six weeks as residue of XB-10. 
Follow-up Actions: 
(1) Fish tissue monitored and "bioprobe" experiments conducted. 
(2) Other health agencies in the area notified. 
(3) XB-10 not banned; there was insufficient evidence. 
The episode appeared to be an isolated event . 
Key Factor not Addressed: 
(1) No information on how the chemical suddenly appeared in 
fish after two decades of use . 
Response: 
(1) Call for a ban of XB-10. 
(2) Soil conditions investigated in affected areas . 
Results: 
(1) Connection made between sea level rise , salinization, 
and increased mobility of the pesticide. 
(2) XB-10 banned in EC . 
Follow-Up Actions: 
(1) Long-term monitoring program established in the river basin . 
(2) Warning issued to families not to drink from public water 
supplies until clearance given by health officials . 
Response: 
( 1) Connection is made to irrigation as a cause of salinization 
and subsequent leaching of XB-10, but it is too late to mitigate 
most of the damages. 
End of simulation. 
(4) Following from (3), an international "incidents registry" should be estab-
lished, the goal being to foster close collaboration amongst environmental 
agencies across Europe, exchanging information routinely on the environ-
mental release of toxic chemicals. 
(5) More rigorous standards for premarket testing of potentially toxic sub-
stances such as the hypothetical XB-10, including assessment of mobility in 
changed physical and chemical environments. 
(6) Establishment of source inventories and environmental pathways in Europe 
for each such substance. 
(7) Creation of incentives for the development of new technologies, including 
bioengineering, for treating contaminated soils, and groundwater. 
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6. Early Warning Monitoring Systems* 
6.1. Introduction 
In order to respond appropriately to a wide array of policy dilemmas, two ques-
tions should be asked: 
(1) Can warning of an undesirable environmental trend be obtained in 
sufficient time to affect policy decisions? 
(2) Even if sufficient warning is obtainable, can a policy be formulated (and 
implemented) to reverse or slow down the trend, or to mitigate the 
impacts? 
In this Section, we deal with the first question. In Section 7, we shall con-
sider the array of policy dilemmas in terms of their "manageability", assuming 
that early warning is indeed available. 
6.2. A Conceptual Framework 
Many kinds of environmental monitoring systems are operating in Europe today: 
see Appendix C for a list of some of the principal ones. However, a major prob-
lem encountered when trying to detect change in geophysical or ecological time-
series is the natural variability in the environment. By the time a trend has been 
identified and found to be statistically significant, it is often too late to affect pol-
icy decisions, except at extremely high costs to society. 
Recognizing that environmental problems are generally caused by 
socioeconomic activities, a better approach is to seek to locate the earliest point 
in a cause-effect chain that can be used as an early warning indicator. For 
example, it is important to identify new technologies that will ultimately release 
significant amounts of a toxic _ substance into the environment, either as an 
industrial waste or subsequently through end-use disposal (e.g., chloro-
fluorocarbons in spray cans). It is often not possible to penetrate far enough 
back into the cause-effect chain to find an appropriate socioeconomic indicator 
(e.g., in the case of multiple causes, or cumulative small impacts which have 
already compromised the future to a certain extent).** However, there may be 
intermediate points in cause-effect chains where biogeophysical monitoring could 
provide at least a suggestion that change is imminent. For example, following 
Broecker's theory that climate warming would cause a southward deflection of 
the Gulf Stream, an early warning indicator is the salinity profile in the Atlantic 
Ocean south of Greenland (Broecker, 1987). 
The implication of this line of reasoning is that there is a continuing need 
for: (1) models capturing the linkages between socioeconomic factors and 
environmental changes; and (2) assessments of the environmental impacts of new 
• The baaic framework for this Section waa developed at a Think Tank held at IIASA August 4-5, 1988. 
• • But eee Section 6.3. 
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technologies, regulations, policies, operational procedures and cultural shifts. 











Figure 6.1 . A conceptual framework for an early-warning monitoring system. The ele-
ments to be monitored should include not only environmental parameters but also 
selected indicators from Box B and if possible from Box A. In order for the system to be 
useful, the linkages between the boxes and the feedbacks should be captured in appropri-
ate models. 
6.3. Some General Principles 
The design of an early warning monitoring system is problem-specific and also 
depends very much on the scenarios developed (including not-impossible 
futures). It is therefore difficult to provide more than some tentative suggestions 
on the nature of such a system. There are, however,· some general principles that 
may be helpful: 
(1) The probability of rapid changes in an environmental system increases with 
increasing rates of change in the socioeconomic driving variables and / or in 
the environmental components. The usual management practice of trying 
to maintain steady-state conditions in the face of external change leads to a 
reduction in resilience and imposes additional stress on the system. 
(2) Most socioeconomic/environmental systems contain some variables that 
respond more quickly and/or to a greater degree than do others to external 
stress factors. But root-mean-square fluctuations about a trend-line may 
be much larger for some of these variables than for others. It is therefore 
important to estimate the stress-response characteristics and the statistical 
properties of the main variables of the system. Only then can the best 
early-warning indicators be selected. See, for example, Wigley and Jones 
(1981), where it is shown that climate warming is more likely to be revealed 
in middle latitudes in summer, even though the warming will be greatest at 
high latitudes in autumn and winter. 
(3) Some socioeconomic changes cause greater environmental stresses than do 
others. One should therefore begin by trying to attempt to quantify the 
stress-response relations, selecting those that give the greatest impact per 
unit of change in the socioeconomic variables. 
(4) An appropriate spatial scale to consider in an early warning system is that 
of a catchment area, which is easily disturbed by both natural and 
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anthropogenic processes but which is sufficiently large to remove some of 
the noise surrounding the signal. Of course, political and/or socioeconomic 
boundaries may not correspond to those of the catchment area, creating 
design problems for the monitoring systems. Of the various types of catch-
ment areas available for study, large semi-closed ones will be particularly 
useful. The Caspian Sea is one example, where freshwater flow has been 
declining since the 1930s, partly due to the increasing use of irrigation. 
The Caspian Sea is in fact particularly suitable as an outdoor laboratory 
for joint monitoring of environmental and socioeconomic factors (Antonov-
sky et al., 1988). 
(5) Cumulative small disturbances operating over the last 50 years or so may 
already have compromised the future environment. The goal of an early 
warning system is then to provide an estimate of when the system might 
become economically non-profitable or might even collapse ecologically. As 
a first step towards constructing an early warning system for such applica-
tions, an inventory of relevant historical data should be prepared. This 
should be supplemented with indirect indicators of past conditions, e.g., 
pollution emission factors such as amounts of coal mined, lead smelted, etc. 
Here the materials-balance approach will be particularly useful. [See Ayres 
and Rod (1986) and this report, Section 9.1.2.] 
6.4. Some Candidate Early Warning Indicators 
of Environmental Change 
Some early warning indicators of environmental change in Europe are suggested 
belo~ . In each case, the indicator will need to be elaborated, in collaboration 
with potential users of such information. Particular attention will have to be 
paid to temporal and spatial resolutions. 
(1) Energy: consumption; efficiency; percentage use of each type of energy sys-
tem; summer/winter ratios of consumption; emission inventories; develop-
ment of new technologies for pollution emission controls. 
(2) Water quantity: supply (separately for each major source type) ; consump-
tion by main users; consumption per US$1000 of GNP.* 
(3) Natural renewable resources (both terrestrial and aquatic): loss of habitats; 
competition for food or space; nutrient losses and gains; buffering capacities 
of soils and lakes; oxygen depletion in lakes and seas; lime applications to 
acidifying lakes, forests and agricultural land; accumulation of toxic sub-
stances; output of production per unit of resources (including energy) used 
(Tolba, 1986); imports and exports of natural resources and products. 
(4) Managed renewable resources: harvests (quantity and types); nutrient 
losses; accumulation of toxic substances; fertilizer, pesticide and herbicide 
sales; imports and exports of primary and processed foods. See Table 6.1 
• Current values are estimated to be 146, 75 , 90 a.nd 44 m3 for Poland, C1echoelova.kia, GDR and FRG , 
respectively, for example (Kindler, 1988). 
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(Huffman, 1987) for some early warning indicators of "trouble ahead" in 
the agricultural sector. In the four categories given in Table 6.1, system 
sustainability is probably most important, although most difficult to quan-
tify. 
(5) Pollution control equipment: fact sheets on technological developments and 
assessments of their potential; installation of air pollution control equip-
ment and construction of sewage treatment plants; installation of recycling 
systems; fact sheets on community recycling programs; funds expended. 
(6) Land use: changes in allocation amongst urban, industrial, agricultural, 
forest, recreation, transportation and special dedicated uses of land (e.g., 
military); rate of development of resort and retirement areas [see, for exam-
ple, Manning (1988)]. 
Table 6.1 . Indicators that could provide early warning of "trouble ahead" in the agricul-





6.5. Some Examples 
Changes in topsoil depth, soil organic 
matter content, structure, texture, bulk density, 
compaction, buffering capacity, salt content, 
concentrations of toxic substances, slope steepness 
and length of slope, cropping practices and climate. 
Changes in farm incomes, debt/equity ratios, 
capital use efficiencies, employment rates. 
Changes in self-satisfaction of farmers 
and farm workers, migration to cities. 
Changes in ability to withstand shocks 
such as droughts, floods, pest outbreaks, etc. 
For some of the long-term environmental dilemmas discussed in Section 5, we 
can tentatively suggest some early warning monitoring strategies, ranking our 
ability to obtain such warnings for the array of dilemmas. 
Example 1: Summer oxidant episodes (a simple case to analyze) 
{see Section 5.1.11) 
Scenario: Increased severity and frequency of oxidant episodes in Southern and 
Central Europe due to increased use of air conditioning equipment, leading to 
increased energy consumption during summer heat waves and to increased emis-
sions of NOx from power stations. The problem could arise as a result of climate 
warming, changed life styles, or a combination of both. 
Early warning indicators: Annual sales of air conditioners; summer energy con-
sumption. (Note that data would be required for all of Central and Southern 
Europe.) 
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Example 2: Water shortages (see Section 5.1.1) 
Scenario: Increased competition for water due to climate warming, with 
decreased rainfall in the southern half of Europe. There may be water "barriers" 
(Kindler, 1988) in some countries that will seriously hinder development. 
Early warning indicators: ·Gross regional product (GRP) and water availability, 
together with a model relating the two. As an example, Jansson (1988) has 
described a study of water demand and supply on the island of Gotland (in the 
Baltic Sea), where regional economic development is subject to water con-
straints. There has been a decline in the reserves of fresh water since the middle 
of the last century, due to reduced groundwater recharge and increased surface 
runoff as a result of land drainage and reclamation. Using a rather detailed 
model, the relation shown in Figure 6.2 was developed as a tool for policy 
analysis . At low levels of water availability, the food and cement industries, and 
the tourist sector on the island would be almost eliminated. So trends in GRP 
and water availability are appropriate early warning indicators of approaching 
water barriers . [Although water consumption is not expected to increase very 
much over Europe as a whole (see Section 4.2.2) , there might be national excep-
tions, and this parameter should also be monitored. ] 
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Figure 6.2. Gross regional product (GRP) versus available water for the island of Got-
land in the Baltic, based on an ecological-economic model (Jansson, 1988). 
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Example 3: Soil acidification (see Section 5.1.2) 
Scenario: Steady or even increasing emissions of SOx and NOx, causing increas-
ing soil acidification. 
Early warning indicators: First priority - annual emission inventories; regular 
monitoring of soil buffering capacity. (Note that pH is not a useful early warning 
indicator.) 
Example 4: Wood supply shortfalls (see Section 5.1.3) 
Scenario: Rapidly declining wood supply due to increased demand for wood, col-
lapse in overseas supplies and decline of the European wood supply (due to tree 
age, air pollution and/or climate warming). 
Early warning indicators: Imports and prices of wood and wood products from 
overseas; European wood demand; European wood supply (including tree ages, 
hectares of forest, net annual increment of standing stock). Note that declining 
imports, increasing wood demand, decreasing supply and declining recruitment 
of replacement trees would soon lead to a wood supply shortfall. 
Example 5: Abandoned farm land (see Section 5.1.4) 
Scenario: Farmland abandoned and neglected. Cessation of liming, leading to 
leaching of toxic substances and nutrients into water bodies. Wind erosion of 
soils in Southern Europe during dry spells. Increased risk of avalanches and 
mud slides in the case of abandoned alpine meadows. 
Early warning indicators: Income per hectare of marginal farms; rate of aban-
donment of farm land; soil characteristics of such lands. 
Example 6: Sea level rise (see Section 5.1.5) 
Scenario: Sea level rise of 1 metre over a very few decades. 
Early warning indicators: None available, although some intermediate warning 
would be given by local measurements of sea level and the salt content in 
groundwater, together with some general indicators of climate warming such as 
emissions of greenhouse gases and rises in the temperatures. Hydrographic 
models could be used to identify the coastal zones at greatest risk. 
Example 7: Chemical time bombs (see Section 5.1.6) 
Scenario: Changes in land use and climate, and slow continued accumulation of 
toxic materials in soils and sediments, despite decreasing emissions of these sub-
stances, increasing the potential for the release of chemical time bombs as 
described by Stigliani (1988). 
Early warning indicators: An accurate, detailed accounting of the flows of 
hazardous chemicals through the industrial economy, based on the concept of 
Industrial Metabolism (see Ayres et al., 1989). This entails a materials-balance 
approach which tracks pathways of chemicals from production and processing to 
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end uses and disposal. Often, estimates of the accumulation of trace substances 
in the environment can be obtained more accurately by this method than by 
standard monitoring. In this connection, the direct emissions of potentially toxic 
substances from factories may not be so important in some cases as end-use 
disposals, e.g., lead batteries, CFCs in refrigerants. 
It will also be of critical importance to monitor the chemical changes that 
regulate the main ecological storage capacities for toxics, e.g., buffering capacity, 
adsorption capacity, and redox potential (see Stigliani, 1988). 
Example 8: The crisis in air traffic and the introduction of 
hydrogen-burning aircraft (see Section 5.1.9) 
Scenario: A large increase in air travel, both inter-city within Europe and inter-
continental, causing great stress on overloaded air-transport systems. A resulting 
increase in NOx emissions and in tropospheric ozone (Bruh! and Crutzen, 1988), 
exacerbating the summer oxidant episode issue discussed in Example 1. Also , 
development of a new technology for high-speed aircraft, flying in the strato-
sphere and burning hydrogen as fuel. But combustion of hydrogen, normally a 
clean technology in the troposphere, has unknown and possibly harmful conse-
quences in the stratosphere. 
Early warning indicators: 
(a) For tropospheric ozone - aircraft traffic and NOx emission data. 
(b) For stratospheric effects - none available. Once research and development 
on hydrogen-burning aircraft is sufficiently far advanced, it will be difficult 
to prevent operational use. It is therefore important to maintain a close 
watch on engineering developments and to undertake concurrent assess-
ments of the atmospheric impacts of such aircraft. 
6.6. The Role of Models 
A successful early warning monitoring system requires that the inter-
relationships amongst socioeconomic and environmental processes be reasonably 
well understood. Sometimes the linkages between causes and effects are quite 
direct and the main question to be discussed is the speed with which the environ-
ment would respond to the postulated socioeconomic changes. The dilemma on 
summer oxidants is a good example. 
Sometimes, however, the linkages between causes and effects . are rather 
tenuous. For example, the scenarios shown in Figure 4. 7 reveal quite substantial 
differences in sea level rise for the 90, 50 and 10% probability cases . As pointed 
out by Jager (1988), the uncertainties in these estimates are contributed about 
equally by uncertainties in future greenhouse-gas concentrations and in the 
resulting response of the climate system. In such cases, a monitoring system 
could not be designed that by itself would provide sufficient early warning to 
influence policy formulation. In such cases, model predictions themselves give 
the only early warning signals . 
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7. Some Plausible Environmental Consequences 
of Four Alternative Development Paths 
7.1. Some Selected Development Paths 
Reflecting on the information contained in the six previous sections, one could 
envisage a myriad of alternative development paths and environmental scenarios 
for Europe. Elaboration of these many pathways would not, however, be of any 
use to policy people, and a short list is essential. Future studies could explore 
other options of special interest to particular groups of people. 
The development paths considered in this section are: 
(1) Present trends continuing in Europe and elsewhere, i.e., slow economic 
growth and modest success in slowing down environmental change, imply-
ing moderate climatic warming by the year 2030 (i.e., greater than the 
changes given in Figures 4.1 to 4.4, but less than the changes shown in Fig-
ures 4.5 and 4.6, and a sea level rise of about 20 cm). 
(2) High-growth economy in Europe and elsewhere, with continued economic 
expansion, and only lip-service being paid to the environment.* This 
development pathway implies strong climatic warming as shown in Figures 
4.5 and 4.6, and a one-metre sea level rise by the year 2030. 
(3) An environmentally friendly economy in Europe and elsewhere. There 
would be greater conservation and recycling of natural resources, energy 
efficiency, emission controls and similar environmentally friendly actions, as 
well as a significant reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases. This 
development pathway leads to only slight climatic warming by the year 
2030, as shown in Figures 4.1 to 4.4, and minimal sea level rise. 
( 4) An environmentally friendly economy in Europe but not elsewhere, where 
there is high economic growth without adequate environmental protection, 
implying strong climate warming by 2030 as in pathway (2) . 
These four development pathways are sufficiently different (in terms of 
socioeconomic development trends) to provide useful comparisons of environ-
mental consequences. Development pathway (4) raises the interesting question: 
"What if Europe becomes a good environmental housekeeper, but other parts of 
the world aim for high industrial growth without adequate environmental protec-
tion?" Also it should be emphasized that even in the case of the environmentally 
"best" development pathway (3), European sustainability over the long term is 
not necessarily guaranteed. This is a question that requires considerable addi-
tional research. 
• AB noted in the Brundtland Commission Report (WCED, 1987), poverty is a major cause of environmen-
tal degradation, especially in the less developed countries. Hence, the assumption made here is that high 
economic growth and ecological sustainability are incompatible only when societies are not willing to enact 
the appropriate measures necessary for sustaining the environment . 
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The term environmentally friendly is not defined specifically. However, 
actions that would contribute to an environmentally friendly world are discussed 
in more detail in Section 8.2. 
7.2. A Framework f.or Assessing the Seriousness of the Dilemmas 
Even when the number of European development paths is limited to four, quite a 
few environmental components and indicators could be used in the assessment of 
each development option (see Table 2.1). Again a very short list is essential, 
particularly if development pathways are to be compared. In subsequent studies, 
the social consequences of various other combinations of the scenarios and turn-
ing points given in Section 4 could be usefully evaluated. 
A good way to provide a focus for the assessment is to use the short list of 
dilemmas discussed in Section 5. * For each of these, the following characteristics 
of the hypothesized future conditions are important: 
Factor 
( 1) Intensity 
(2) Extent 
(3) Preventability** 
• Early warning 
• Uncertainty 
• Available technology 
• Cost 
• Social/political acceptability 
(4) Environmental Response Time 
(5) Social Adaptability 
Explanatory remarks 
Severity per unit area or unit population 
Spatial aspects 
Is society willing and able to act soon 
enough to forestall or ameliorate the prob-
lem before it becomes serious? 
Can the environmental problem be 
detected before the effects are manifested? 
How certain are model predictions? 
Are there technological means available to 
forestall or solve the problem? 
How expensive are the measures to coun-
teract the problem? 
Are there over-riding social or political 
barriers to overcome the problem? 
Once society undertakes remedial mea-
sures, how long does it take the environ-
ment to recover (years, decades, centu-
ries)? 
If the problem cannot be forestalled or 
solved, is society willing or able to adapt to 
the new conditions? 
• The dilemma. on controlling globa.l emissions of COl (Section 5.1.8) will be excluded because it is impli-
cit in development pa.thwa.ys (2) a.nd (4). 
•• A mea.aure of the time sea.le required to mobilise aocieta.l responses to perceived environmental threats 
compared to the time period before the onset of the full ma.nifeata.tion of the effects. 
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Tables 7.1 to 7.4 show for each of the development paths an assessment of 
the seriousness of each characteristic with respect to each dilemma for the year 
2030. In each cell of the tables, a number 1, 2, or 3 is assigned according to our 
assessment of seriousness; i.e., 
1: not serious 
2: moderately serious 
3: very serious. 
A number for the factor Preventability is obtained as an arithmetic average 
of the five subfactors. The rationale is that all of these contribute to an overall 
assessment of whether or not society can or will react soon enough to forestall 
and/or ameliorate the problem. This is to be contrasted with the factor 
Environmental Response Time, which is an indication of how soon the environ-
ment will react to measures once they have been undertaken. Obviously, an 
irreversible effect would have an infinite response time and would result in a seri-
ousness value of 3. 
It is important to note that the simplified scale of 1, 2, 3 was chosen 
because this assessment is of necessity qualitative in nature. A more finely-tuned 
scale, in our opinion, would have given a misleading impression of precision. 
Currently, no generally accepted quantitative methods exist for comparing the 
seriousness of widely different environmental problems. Thus, recent studies 
evaluating the relative seriousness of a range of environmental issues have 
employed a qualitative approach (Darmstadter et al., 1987; EPA, 1987). As 
noted in the US EPA study (1987), the results of such qualitative analyses can 
be regarded as judgmentally correct and unlikely to be far wrong. That study 
further noted that for the purposes of priority setting, absolute precision is not 
mandatory. Rather, what is required is sufficient precision to allow comparative 
ranking. Such a qualitative approach is taken here, and we believe that the 
method is useful for the purpose of comparing the seriousness of the various 
dilemmas on a European-wide basis. For particular regions, concerns and priori-
ties might be different, but our approach could easily be adapted to suit the 
needs of other assessments. 
Tables 7.1 to 7.4 contain too much information to permit useful visual com-
parisons of the relative seriousness of various combinations of dilemmas and 
development pathways. However, they are included for reference, providing our 
best estimates of seriousness for each development path, dilemma and dilemma 
characteristic. In Section 7 .3 the information is given in aggregated form. 
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Table 7.1. Development Pathway (1) for the year 2030: Present Trends Continuing in 
Europe and Elsewhere. The numbers 1, 2, 3 represent degree of seriousness from low to 
high, with respect to the impact characteristic being evaluated. 
Preventability 
Avail- Environ Adapt-
Early able Social Aver- mental ability 
In ten warn- Uncer technol- accept- age response of 
Dilemma >Sity Extent ing tainty ogy Costs ability value time society 
Water 
manage- 2 2 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 2 2 2 
ment 
Soil 
acidifi- 3 2 (3) (1) (1) (3) (2) 2 2 3 
cation 
Forestry 
wood 2 1 (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) 2 2 2 
supply 
Margin-
alized 2 2 (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) 2 1 2 
land 
Coastal issues 
• Sea level 2 2 (2) (3) (2) (2) (2) 2 2 2 
• Pollution 2 2 (2) (1) (2) (2) (2) 2 1 2 
Chemical 
time 2 1 (3) (3) (3) (2) (2) 3 3 2 
bombs 
Non-point 
toxics 2 1 (3) (3) (3) (2) (2) 3 3 2 
Transport 
growth 3 3 (2) (3) (3) (3) (2) 3 3 3 
Urbani-
zation 1 1 (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) 1 1 1 
Summer 
oxidant 3 2 (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) 2 1 2 
episodes 
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Table 7.2. Development Pathway (2) for the year 2030: High-Growth Economy in Eu-
rope and Elsewhere (with little concern for the environment). The numbers 1, 2, 3 
represent degree of seriousness from low to high, with respect to the impact characteris-
tic being evaluated. 
Preventability 
Avail- Environ Adapt-
Early able Social Aver mental ability 
lnten warn- Uncer technol- accept- age response of 
Dilemma isity Extent ing tainty ogy Coau ability value time isociety 
Water 









3 (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) 3 3 3 
Margin-
alized 2 3 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 2 2 2 
land 
Coastal issues 
• Sea level 3 2 (2) (3) (2) (3) (3) 3 3 3 




2 (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 3 3 3 
Non-point 
toxics 3 2 (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 3 3 3 
Transport 
growth · 3 3 (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 3 3 3 
Urbani-




3 (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 2 2 3 
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Table 7.9. Development Pathway (3) for the year 2030: Environmentally Friendly 
Economy in Europe and Elsewhere. The numbers 1, 2, 3 represent degree of seriousness 
from low to high , with respect to the impact characteristic being evaluated. 
Preventability 
Avail- Environ Adapt-
Early able Social Aver mental ability 
llnten warn- Uncer technol- accept- age response of 
Dilemma 1Bity Extent ing tainty ogy Costs ability value time society 
Water 
manage- 1 1 (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) 1 1 1 
ment 
Soil 
acidifi- 1 1 ( 1) (1) (1) (3) (1) 1 1 1 
cation 
Forestry 
wood 1 1 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) 1 1 1 
supply 
Margin-
alized 1 1 (1) (1) 
land 
(1) (2) (2) 1 1 2 
Coastal issue~ 
• Sea level 1 1 (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) 1 1 1 
• Pollution 1 1 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) 1 1 1 
Chemical 
time 2 1 (2) (2) (1) (3) (1) 2 2 1 
bombs 
Non-point 
toxics 2 1 (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) 2 2 1 
Transport 
growth 2 3 (1) (2) (2) (3) (1) 2 2 · 2 
Urbani-
zation 1 1 (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) 1 1 1 
Summer 
oxidant 1 1 (1) (2) (2) (3) (1) 2 1 1 
episodes 
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Table 7.{ Development Pathway (4) for the year 2030: Environmentally Friendly 
Economy in Europe, but not Elsewhere. The numbers 1, 2, 3 represent degree of serious-
ness from low to high, with respect to the impact characteristic being evaluated. 
PretJentability 
A tJaiJ- .. Environ Adapt-
Early able Social AtJU· mental ability 
In ten warn- Uncer technol- accept- age response of 
Dilemma lsity Extent ing tainty ogy Costs ability tJalue time society 
Water 





1 (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) 2 1 1 
Forestry 
rwood 2 2 (2) (3) 
supply 




3 (2) (2) (2) (3) (2) 2 2 2 
Coastal issues 
• Sea level 3 2 (2) (3) (2) (3) (1) 2 3 3 




2 (3) (3) (2) (3) (1) 2 2 1 
Non-point 
toxics 2 1 (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) 2 2 1 
Transport 
growth 2 3 (2) (2) (2) (3) (1) 2 2 2 
Urbani-
zation 2 2 (1) (2) (1) (3) (2) 2 2 2 
Summer 
oxidant 2 2 (1) (2) 
episodes 
(2) (3) (1) 2 1 2 
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7.3. Environmental Implications of Alternative Development Paths 
7.3.1. Assessment of alternative pathways 
Table 7.5 summarizes, for each combination of development pathway and 
dilemma given in Tab.Les 7.1 to 7.4, our integrated assessment of seriousness for 
the year 2030. To obtain the numbers in Table 7.5, the numbers corresponding 
to the five factors in each row of each table were first summed. These summa-
tions resulted in "raw scores" with a possible range from 5 to 15. These were 
then converted to a scale of 1 to 3 as follows: 5-8 = 1; 9-11 = 2; 12-15 = 3. 
Both the "raw scores" and the smoothed values were used in the analyses in Sec-
tion 7.3.2. Viewing Table 7.5 across a row, one may observe how the ranking of a 
particular dilemma changes according to development path. Viewed vertically, 
one may observe the relative seriousness of each dilemma for a particular 
development pathway. Also listed are the relative rankings of the dilemmas in 
the 1980s. Each column is summed, providing an overall index of seriousness 
relative to the dilemmas for each development path. The minimum score, 
corresponding to the most favourable environment is 11. The maximum score, 
corresponding to the least favourable environment, is 33. The relatively low 
value (14) assigned to the 1980s' environment should not be interpreted as signi-
fying that the current European environment is without major problems. 
Rather, it suggests that with respect to the dilemmas that we have chosen, the 
potential major consequences have yet to be experienced. In fact, the dilemmas 
were specifically chosen as problems for the future, rather than those that are 
currently fully manifested. 
_One may observe that relative to the 1980s, pathway (1) (present trends 
continuing in Europe and elsewhere) would lead to a somewhat more degraded 
environment in 2030, since all of the dilemmas except urbanization and summer 
oxidant episodes would become more serious. The dilemmas are somewhat tem-
pered by only moderate European climate change. 
Pathway (2) (high-growth economy in Europe and elsewhere, but low 
environmental concern) would lead to strong deterioration with respect to all 
dilemmas. Some of the degradation is related to specific European activities, 
which would cause increased consumption of natural resources, as well as 
increased chemical inputs to the environment. Broad-scale, strong climatic 
change creates problems related to water management, sea level rise, and sum-
mer oxidant episodes, and global deforestation affects forestry wood supply. 
Pathway (3) (environmentally friendly economy in Europe and elsewhere) is 
the only one for which the dilemmas are largely solved, although the problem of 
transport growth would remain due to the rapid increase in demand in air travel. 
Pathway ( 4) (environmentally friendly economy in Europe, but not else-
where) is particularly interesting because it highlights the important question of 
the linkages of the European environment to the global environment. It thus 
represents the optimal degree to which Europe can protect its environment when 
high growth, non-sustainable development is occurring in the rest of the world. 
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Table 7.5. Ranking of dilemmas for the 1980s and according to development path for 
the year 2030. The numbers 1, 2, 3 represent degree of seriousness from low to high . 
Pathway {2} Pathway {9} Pathway (.t) 
Pathway {1} High- Environ- Environ-
Present growth mentally mentally 
trends economy/low l/riendly friendly 
continuing env. concern economy economy 
(Europe and (Europe and {Europe and (Europe but 
Dilemma 1980s elsewhere} elsewhere} elsewhere} not elsewhere) 
Water 
manage- 1 2 3 1 3 
ment 
Soil 
acidifi- 2 3 3 1 1 
ication 
Forestry 
wood 1 2 3 1 3 
supply 
Margin-
alized 1 2 2 1 2 
land 
Coastal issues 
• Sea level 1 2 3 1 3 
• Pollution 1 2 2 1 1 
Chemical 
time 1 2 3 1 2 
bombs 
Non-point 
toxics 1 2 3 1 1 
TransJX>rt 
growth 2 3 3 2 2 
Urbani-
zation 1 1 2 1 2 
Summer 
ioxidant 2 2 3 1 2 
!episodes 
Total 14 23 30 12 22 
i7 
Compared to pathway (2), the worst-case scenario, one may observe that Europe 
definitely would benefit from an environmentally friendly pathway (seriousness 
score of 22 versus 30). 
A final point that should be made with respect to Table 7.5 concerns the 
near equivalence {23 versus 22) of the seriousness scores for pathways (1) and {4) 
(present trends continuing in Europe and elsewhere versus an environmentally 
friendly economy in Europe but not elsewhere). In both cases, serious problems 
arise by the year 2030 but they are different: 
Pathway (1) Pathway (4) 
{moderate climate warming) (strong climate warming) 
• soil acidification • water management 
• transport growth • forestry wood supply 
• sea level rise 
Hence it should not be construed from Table 7.5 that pathways (1) and (4) 
are more or less equivalent with respect to overall environmental impact. In fact , 
if a fifth development path were envisaged (present trends continuing in Europe, 
but with strong climate warming), the number of "very serious" problems would 
be more than the three associated with pathway (4). 
These findings strongly suggest that Europe should proceed quickly in 
implementing an environmentally friendly pathway of economic development. 
However, such a policy will not resolve many of the long-term environmental 
dilemmas facing Europe. As Table 7.5 clearly shows, there is need to promote 
environmentally friendly strategies not only in Europe but also in the rest of the 
world. By way of example and through financial and technological incentives , 
Europe should assume a leadership role in this most important task . 
7.3.2. Ordering the dilemmas 
Two questions remain to be considered: 
• Which dilemmas are most sensitive to the development pathway selected? 
• Within each development path, which dilemmas are most serious? 
Table 7. 6 provides an answer to the first question.* As can be seen , water 
management, soil acidification, forestry wood supply, and sea level rise are most 
sensitive to the development path chosen. On the other hand, transport growth 
and urbanization are relatively insensitive to the development path selected. 
• In the preparation of Table! 7.6 and 7. 7, "raw scores" (ranging from 5 to 15) were used; see authors for 
details . 
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Table 7.6. Grouping of dilemmas with regard to their sensitivity to development path 
for the year 2030. 
Relatively sensitive to development path 
• Water management 
• Soil acidification 
• Forestry wood supply 
• Sea level rise 
Moderately sensitive to development path 
• Marginalized land 
• Coastal pollution 
• Chemical time bombs 
• Non-point toxics 
• Summer oxidant episodes 
Relatively insensitive to development path 
• Transport growth 
• Urbanization 
Table 7. 7 provides an answer to the second question, showing the dilemmas 
that ought to be of most concern for Europeans for each of the four development 
paths . The first remark to be made about this table is that the ordering of the 
dilemmas changes from one pathway to another, and this undoubtedly would 
cause problems in the formulation of policies expected to be robust over a range 
of development pathways. Secondly, the table reemphasizes a point made ear-
lier, viz. , that the seriousness of the environmental problems facing Europe in the 
year 2030 depends on two factors : 
(1) Failure to take effective global actions to control greenhouse gases and 
deforestation [development paths (2) , (4) and to some extent (l) ], leading 
to serious European problems with respect to water management, forestry 
wood supply and sea level rise. 
(2) Failure to take effective European actions to control local and regional 
environmental degradation [development paths (1) and (2) ], leading to seri-
ous problems with respect to soil acidification and transport growth. 
Pathway (2) is the worst , combining failures to take both global and Euro-
pean actions . This leads not only to the five problems listed above but also to 
three additional very serious ones: chemical time bombs, non-point toxics and 
summer oxidant episodes. 
Finally, Table 7.8 is included to emphasize the very important effects that 
strong climate warming would have on the European environment. Nearly all of 
the 11 dilemmas become more urgent to resolve with increasing probability of a 
major change in climate. 
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Table 7. 7. Ranking of the dilemmas for the 1980s and for each development path for the 
year 2030. 
Pathway Very serious Moderately serious Not serious 
1980s Soil acidification Water management 
Transport growth Forestry wood supply 
Summer oxidants Marginalized land 
Sea level 
Coastal pollution 
Chemical time bombs 
Non-point toxics 
Urbanization 
Present trends Soil acidification Water management Urbanization 
continuing Transport growth Forestry wood supply 
(Europe and Marginalized land 
elsewhere) Sea level 
Coastal pollution 
Chemical time bombs 
Non-point toxics 
Summer oxidants 
High-growth Water management Marginalized land 
economy/ Soil acidification Coastal pollution 
low environ- Forestry wood supply Urbanization 
mental concern Sea level 
(Europe and Chemical time bombs 
elsewhere) Non-point toxics 
Transport growth 
Summer oxidants 
Environmentally Transport growth Water management 
friendly economy Soil acidification 
(Europe and Forestry wood supply 
elsewhere) Marginalized land 
Sea level 
Coastal pollution 




Environmentally Water management Marginalized land Soil acidification 
friendly economy Forestry wood supply Chemical time bombs Coastal pollution 
(Europe but Sea level Transport growth Non-point toxics 
not elsewhere) Urbanization 
Summer oxidants 
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Table 7.8. Potential effects of a strong global climate warming on the European en-
vironment . 
Dilemma Effect 
Water Large changes in water supply (b6th up and down) 
management 
Soil Changing weather patterns would change acid deposition patterns 
acidification (worse conditions in some areas, better conditions in others) 
Forestry Increased temperatures, major changes in precipitation , seriously 
wood stressing bOreal forests 
supply 
Marginalized Some areas may become unsuitable for current uses, owing to salt wa-
land ter intrusions, latitudinal shifts in areas of optima.I crop production, 
etc. 
Coa.sta.l Sea. level rise ca.using soil and groundwater sa.linization; flooding of 
issues toxic waste dumps located near coasts 
Chemical Sea level rise mobilizing heavily polluted sediments with clean waters ; 
time bombs drying of wetlands ca.uses release of many toxic materials 
Non-point Not greatly affected if recycling is effective 
toxics 
Transport No specific direct effects 
growth 
Urbanization Current urban land use in coastal a.nd alpine regions may not be suit-
able under changed climatic conditions 
Summer Increases in NOx owing to increased demand for electricity , especially 
oxidant in Southern Europe in summer for air-conditioning 
episodes 
8. Major Findings and General Recommendations on Policies 
Appropriate for Sustaining the European Environment 
8.1. Major Findings 
Based on the analyses presented in Section 7, the major findings of the study are: 
Major Findings 
• Because of the linkages between the European and global environments, 
sustaining the European environment in the 21st century cannot be fully 
achieved without sustaining the global environment. 
• The continuation of present trends in economic development and environ-
mental protection in Europe and elsewhere is not sufficient to prevent 
further deterioration of the European environment. 
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• High economic growth in Europe and elsewhere without adequate environ-
mental protection accompanying such growth will lead to even more severe 
environmental problems. 
• Environmentally friendly development in Europe offers the hope of mitigat-
ing local and regional-scale problems specific to Europe. 
• But these actions, in and of themselves, cannot solve problems within 
Europe stemming from global scale changes. To accomplish the latter, the 
rest of the world must also follow environmentally friendly pathways . 
• Thus, European nations should do all in their power to enact environmen-
tally friendly development both in Europe and the rest of the world. 
8.2. General Recommendations on Policies Appropriate 
for Sustaining the European Environment 
8.2.f. Ecologically sustainable development as a conceptual 
framework for European environmental policy 
Ecologically sustainable development is defined as "development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs" (WCED, 1987). This goal is one with which everyone can cer-
tainly agree. However, there is currently lack of clarity about how precisely to 
achieve it, although development pathway (3) in our analysis (environmentally 
friendly economy in Europe and elsewhere) appears to be approaching that goal. 
[See Turner {1988) and Munn {1988) for a more detailed discussion.] 
The first pre-condition in the search for sustainable development is for 
European societies to recognize that many of the major environmental issues fac-
ing Europe are long-term (e.g., half a century), large-scale (continental to glob-
al), interconnected and, prone to surprises (chemical time bombs, for example). 
The second pre-condition is that societies should develop a philosophy by 
which they are willing to sacrifice short-term gains (economic or otherwise) for 
the sake of long-term benefits to future generations. But this pre-condition can 
only be met if societies have sufficient information to recognize the need for 
sacrifice, and if governments provide institutional means (incentives, for exam-
ple) to ensure that people feel that they are treated fairly. Within this frame-
work, a number of general recommendations can be made. 
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8.2.2. Promotion of environmentally friendly development 
in Europe and the world 
Europe. European societies must act to ensure that potential long-term, large-
scale environmental problems are addressed today so that they will not worsen 
in the future. With respect to the dilemmas discussed in this study, Table 8.1 
lists examples of such actions. 
The World. Within the various international forums available, European 
nations should use their influence to promote ecologically sustainable develop-
ment in all parts of the world. This would include facilitation of the transfer of 
environmentally friendly technologies to the Third World and encouragement of 
actions such as those indicated in Table 8.1. Even as a matter of self-interest, 
Europe should set an example in the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases 
and should encourage other regions to do likewise. 
Table 8.1. Environmentally friendly mitigation actions. 
Dilemma Action 
Water Public acceptance of water-conservation practices; development and 
management implementation of water-saving technologies 
Soil Large reductions in SOx and NOx emissions by implementation of 
acidification cleaning technologies 
Forestry Reductions in ozone and acidity; long-term planning of timber harvest 
wood 
supply 
Marginalized Program for soil protection and landscape preservation, reforestation, 
land etc. 
Coastal Large reductions in runoff of N, P fertilizers; installation of sewage 
issues treatment plants 
Chemical Introduction of early-warning monitoring systems; research into fac-
time bombs tors causing sudden chemical releases; establishing an international 
"incidents registry" 
Non-point Extensive recycling of commercial and domestic products; reduction of 
toxics N, P fertilizer runoff; use of environmentally friendly products; in-
tegrated pest management in agriculture 
Transport Use of clean fuels and clean combustion technologies 
growth 
Urbanization Long-term land use planning with strong public support 
Summer Large reductions in NOx and hydrocarbon emissions; energy conserva-
oxidant ti on 
episodes 
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8.2.3. Recommendations to citizens 
Above all, the public must become more environmentally conscious. Citizens 
must accept the stewardship of the environment as their personal responsibility. 
They must view ecological sustainability and its fulfillment as an obligation to 
future generations. Some of the not insignificant ways in which people can help 
include: 
• Conservation of energy, water, and materials. 
• Recycling of wastes. 
• Selection of environmentally friendly products: those requmng mm1mum 
amounts of energy to produce and those whose end-uses or residues cause 
minimum environmental damage. 
• Participation in consumer-related activities pertaining to environmental 
protection. 
Before such a strong public commitment will occur, however, governments 
must strongly support environmental education programs that will sensitize the 
layman to the critical issues and motivate him to act. Another important 
governmental activity would be the provision of environmental information that 
permits citizens and the private sector to make environmentally sound decisions. 
8.2.4. Recommendations to industry, agriculture, 
forestry and business 
Industry, agriculture, forestry and business can contribute substantially to the 
promotion of sustainable development. That industry is aware of these oppor-
tunities is clear from recent publications such as WICEM (1984) and CON-
CA WE (1987). As noted by Yu. Izrael* (personal communication, 1988) the 
most cost-effective environmental management strategies for the long term are 
quite different than for the short term. Moreover, the selection of a single "best" 
strategy is made difficult owing to the many complex linkages amongst economic, 
technical and institutional factors. In some instances, e.g., declining industries, 
it may be wise to opt for short-term measures while for emerging industries, it 
may be crucial to implement long-term strategies, which may require incentives, 
economic or otherwise. In general terms, however, some of the ways that sus-
tainable development can be promoted include: 
• Conservation of energy, water and materials in industrial processing. 
• Waste reduction, e.g., through recycling, and designing manufacturing 
processes that create less waste. [There is growing realization that the cost 
of handling wastes is becoming excessive so that waste reduction makes 
good sense economically (Hollod and McCartney, 1988).] 
• Chairman of the USSR Sta.te Committee for Hydrometeorology . 
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• More efficient pollution control equipment in factories, power stations, 
automobiles, etc. In the European Community, the pollution control sector 
already generates more than 1 % of Community Gross Regional Product 
(CONCA WE, 1987). A related statistic is that the money spent on pollu-
tion control in ECE countries is estimated to be less than the cost of pollu-
tion damage (ECE, 1987).* 
• Promotion of environmental assessments of new technologies and products, 
and giving higher priority to those deemed to be more environmentally 
benign. 
• Active promotion of environmentally friendly products and technologies. 
• Reductions in agricultural pollution through implementing strategies for 
limiting, to a minimum, excess chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Such 
strategies include conservation practices, new, more efficient, less-polluting 
technologies, and the promotion of integrated pest management schemes, 
such as biological control (Bal and van Lenteren, 1987). 
Finally as noted by A.S. Isaev** (personal communication, 1988), the forest 
industry has special responsibilities with respect to environmental management. 
Woodlands play a crucial role in stabilizing the natural environment. They 
greatly influence and regulate hydrologic cycles, and thus the flow of waters and 
local humidity conditions. They also filter air pollutants, thus protecting vulner-
able soils and water bodies within forested watersheds. For example, the unique 
purity of the water in Lake Baikal is a result of the filtering effects of the sur-
rounding forests. . 
Thus, forests should not be viewed as merely a "mine" for wood products 
and paper but should be managed to take advantage also of their positive 
influences on the environment. In the FRG, forests are to be planted for the 
dual roles of recreation and environmental preservation . Similar measures 
should be considered elsewhere. In the USSR, for example, forestation of new 
land created by the receding of the Aral Sea will be necessary for protecting soils 
against salinization caused by wind-blown salt deposition. 
8.2.5. Recommendations to governments 
Prohibition and regulation are only two of the instruments available to govern-
ments to improve the quality of the environment. Various tax incentives, pricing 
structures, effiuent charges, international trade policies and other mechanisms 
are available, and may be more effective in many cases. Some examples are: 
• Incentives for conserving energy and water, recycling of wastes, and reduc-
ing industrial wastes. 
• The ECE Secretariat comments (ECE, 1987) that: "ECE member countries are continuing to use up 
their environmental assets, either because the assimilative capacity of the environment is exceeded or be-
cause ecologically unsustainable activities are engaged in.• 
•• Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Forestry. 
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• Financial support for industrial research designed to improve energy 
efficiency, e.g., in houses, automobiles, electric appliances, etc. 
• Incentives for preserving productive soil for agriculture (OECD, 1979). 
(Developers should be given incentives to locate settlements, industry and 
recreational facilities on poorer soils.) 
• Support for environmental education programs that will sensitize the lay-
man to critical environmental issues. 
• Provision of environmental information that permits citizens, industry, 
agriculture and business to make environmentally-sound decisions. 
(a) Publication of natural resource inventories and related data banks . 
(b) Labeling of environmentally friendly consumer products. 
8.2.6. Recommendations to international organizations 
The dilemmas described in this report are generally large-scale, involving many 
European countries. Intergovernmental organizations such as ECE, EEC, 
CMEA, EFT A, OECD and WHO-Europe are therefore important players if the 
long-term environmental agenda for Europe is to be meaningful. At the present 
time these organizations have established Working Groups which provide valu-
able coordination and harmonization with respect to the European environment. 
See, for example, ECE (1986, 1987, 1988b). The approaches taken are very 
appropriate for resolving problems of the current and next decade (e.g., trans-
portation of hazardous goods, pollution of rivers and inland seas). However, 
more emphasis could be placed on the integrative approach required to deal with 
the large-scale interactive changes expected in the next 50 years. Even the moni-
toring data required to evaluate the European environment in an integrated way 
are missing for the most part. This is not intended to be a criticism of intergov-
ernmental organizations but rather a suggestion that they expand their outlook , 
as indeed is occurring in some cases and some countries. One tool that would 
help in setting long-term large-scale environmental agendas is the policy exercise. 
Adoption of this approach at the European level is a major recommendation of 
this Study. 
International non-governmental organizations (e.g., IIASA, SCOPE, IUCN) 
and programs (e.g., ICSU Global Change) can also contribute importantly to the 
resolution of regional to global environmental issues, establishing better scientific 
bases for environmental policy formulation. 
Finally, the United Nations and international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can play a large and cru-
cially important role in promoting environmentally friendly development in the 
Third World. Because the global economy is so closely linked to the global 
environment, every effort must be made to proceed with ecological sustainability 
in the context of the global perspective. 
86 
9. Recommendations for Further Research 
The analysis presented in this report was built on three components: scenarios, 
assessments and policy responses. It was however only a first attempt at a topic 
deserving much greater in-depth analysis. Listed below are recommendations for 
further research that will assist in the overall development of these components 
in the European context. 
9.1. Tasks Related ta Scenario Building 
9.1.1. Land use modelling: an assessment of changing land use 
patterns in response to human change 
Human activities as reflected in socioeconomic and geopolitical developments are 
major determinants of land use. In addition, biophysical conditions have major 
implications for land use, since they set limits to resource use options or define 
opportunities for them. As has been pointed out in Section 4, land use in Europe 
is changing at an ever increasing rate, and this trend is expected to continue, 
particularly in the event of climate change. 
The planning and management of land use for long-term development 
require knowledge of (Manning, 1988): 
• The supply of land as a resource, .defined in biophysical terms based on 
climatic and soil conditions. 
• Future demands on the land resource for human activities, described in 
terms of socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions, and demographic 
trends. 
The characterization of supply and demand components shows that land 
use is determined by interactions among economic development and environmen-
tal change. A view on long-term and broad-scale sustainable land use in Europe 
as a response to human change can be defined as "the best possible long-term 
product of the interaction of supply ... and demand ... " (Manning, 1988). 
As pointed out at IIASA's Warsaw Workshop on Land Use Changes in 
Europe (September 1988), there is an urgent need for scenarios of European land 
use over the next decades in response to human changes and their implications 
for: (i) the allocation of land between the various sectors (agriculture, forests, 
urban), (ii) the management of land (such as deterioration effects of land use) 
and (iii) the problems of externalities. Such scenarios will require an under-
standing of human activities and socioeconomic development in relation to land 
use patterns. The work should include the following components: 
(1) Preparation of land use scenarios for Europe as a response to human 
change. Some plausible changes in European land use patterns are: 
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(a) Environmental changes such as climate change, causing changes in 
land capability to produce food, fibre and timber. Land use patterns 
are also changing due to changing agricultural practices to prevent 
deterioration effects such as leaching of nutrients affecting soils and 
groundwater quality. 
(b) Geopolitical changes such as the extent to which land use patterns in 
Europe might change due for example, to an increasing demand for 
agricultural products on other continents combined with a decline in 
their land potential. 
(c) Changes in technologies which might reduce the requirements for 
land, water and energy. 
(d) Changes in policies (both national and international) such as the level 
of support for agricultural products. The level of subsidies to agricul-
ture will determine future land use patterns to a large extent. 
_(2) Assessment of implications of such changes for development at the regional 
level (in terms of allocation, management and externalities). A series of 
regional studies should be established to prepare such an assessment. A 
criterion for selecting such regions might be the different stages of 
socioeconomic development (such as Gross Domestic Product per unit area 
or per capita), demographic trends (in terms of distribution between rural 
and urban population), or environmental components (such as land or 
water availability per capita) . 
(3) The allocation and subsequent management of future land use patterns at 
the regional level in the presence of important externalities (environmental, 
. economic and political). This will require the identification of viable strat-
egies within the concept of ecological sustainability. 
9.1.2. Industrial metabolism: river basin studies and forecasting 
materials use 
The use of matter and energy in our economic system - that part of the sum 
total of human activities that is concerned with the production and consumption 
of material goods and services generated thereby - is, in some respects, similar to 
the use of matter and energy by biological organisms and ecosystems. The term 
"industrial metabolism", coined by Ayres (Ayres, 1978; Ayres and Kneese, 1989), 
invokes this analogy. 
There have been numerous studies on the global cycling of 
environmentally-active materials and how these cycles are perturbed by human 
activities. However, these studies focus heavily on the environmental effects of 
such perturbations, but say very little about how s~ch materials flow through 
the industrial economy and end up in the environment. They (and other 
currently available studies) therefore give no impression of the detailed sources 
of pollution, how these materials will be used in the future, or how their uses 
may change. 
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Whereas pollution from point sources such as industrial plants and electric 
power plants can be measured directly, it is almost impossible to make detailed 
measurements of pollution at the sources from commercial and consumer uses of 
products containing harmful chemicals. Detailed information on dissipative con-
sumer end uses obtained from economic statistics is important because it may be 
the only method available for estimating pollution from the use of a vast array of 
products. Currently, the relative contribution of, these non-point sources to the 
total pollution load is not well known. However, as industry becomes more regu-
lated in Europe, non-point sources of pollution may make up an increasingly 
larger fraction of the ambient pollution load. If this is true, the implications for 
public policy are enormous. It would mean that monitoring and control of pollu-
tion must focus not only on emissions from point sources, but also on emissions 
emanating from consumer use. This is not altogether a new idea. Public pres-
sures were probably largely responsible for reducing emissions of phosphate in 
phosphate-containing detergents, and the partial ban on the production of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). However, these represent only two cases. Effective 
control of other deleterious chemicals will require much more public awareness of 
pollution caused by the use of commercial and domestic goods and products. 
Such awareness might promote "environmentally friendly" alternatives to com-
mon chemical products found to be environmentally harmful. 
In this connection, river basin studies can be extremely useful for studying 
the cumulative effect of end-use sources of pollutants over large areas. Pollu-
tants, generated by activities within a basin, may enter the river either by direct 
discharge or by runoff from urban, agricultural, and rural areas. Thus in a 
sense, the quality of a river's water with respect to loadings of toxic materials is 
an indicator of the integral sum of all pollutants generated within the basin. If 
the activities causing the pollution can be identified, and the emissions 
quantified, it may be possible to draw conclusions about the relative source-
strengths of the various activities . Several studies of the Hudson-Raritan river 
basin in the US provide perhaps the best available data, on an extended spatial 
and temporal scale, of the sources of pollution in the river waters. The area of 
study encompassed about 37,000 km2. It is an important industrial and commer-
cial area extending from New York harbour in a northward direction about 200 
km. Ayres et al. (1985) studied the history of pollution in the area for eight 
heavy metals and several other pollutants for the period from 1880 to 1980. The 
results. clearly showed an historical shift in the major loadings of the heavy 
metals. Whereas in earlier decades point sources, mostly from industrial produc-
tion processes, were the major sources of pollution, by 1980 pollution from dissi-
pative consumption and its transport via urban and agricultural runoff was the 
dominant source for most of the metals considered . In another study of the same 
basin (Rohmann and Lilienthal, 1987), a similar conclusion was reached . Runoff 
of major pollutants was in some cases several orders of magnitude greater than 
emissions directly from point sources. Interestingly, no pollutant sources from 
runoff are currently regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency. 
It is not clear whether the results of this single river basin are typical of the 
more general case either in North America or Europe, and similar studies should 
be undertaken in European river basins. Also required is a deeper understanding 
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of the changing "metabolism" of industrial society. The central goal is to under-
stand and document how processes of industrial production transform resource 
inputs into outputs that must be absorbed and processed in the environment. 
The specific categories of industrial activity to be considered would likely include 
processes related to the flows of heavy metals, and inorganic compounds such as 
bromine, chlorine, sulfur, nitrogen, and halocarbons. This work would build on 
existing research (Ayres et al., 1989; Norberg-Bohm et al., 1988; Ayres and 
Kneese, 1989). 
Once a detailed book keeping of the sources and flows of selected toxic 
materials has been determined, the next step would be to construct models for 
generating a range of plausible scenarios for materials use (i.e., quantities, types 
of usage and products, geographical distribution, and how uses may change in 
the future). These scenarios (along with land use scenarios described in Section 
9.1.1) would complement the numerous existing scenarios for population and 
energy use. 
9.1.3. Elaboration of the environmental impacts of other 
socioeconomic development paths 
For the sake of clarity, and in order to illustrate a method of ranking the severity 
of the impacts of various dilemmas, only four development paths were considered 
in Section 7. However, the methodology could be extended to examine the 
impacts of other socioeconomic development pathways. 
9.2. Tasks Related to Environmental Assessments 
9.2.1. Climate chemistry 
Numerous studies have been undertaken on the causes and effects of climate 
change, as well as strategies for coping with the expected changes. However, 
there is one important aspect for which much more analysis is required. This is 
the effects of climate change on the flow of deleterious chemicals in the environ-
ment. 
Work in this area could build on studies reported in Section 4 that focused 
on nonlinear and time-delayed environmental effects resulting from saturation or 
shrinking of capacities of soils and sediments for adsorbing toxic materials (Stig-
liani, 1988). If one assumes that the flow of chemicals through the environment is 
more or less in steady state with respect to the current climate, then how would 
those flows change under a different climatic regime? Higher temperatures could 
significantly speed up biological reactions. Increasing or decreasing water avail-
ability will cause changes in flow rates and sedimentation of harmful materials. 
It will change the depth of water tables with subsequent changes in groundwater 
quality. Rising sea levels will stir up coastal sediments currently loaded with 
toxic chemicals. 
Some of the topics that ought to be considered include: 
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(1) Acidic deposition: How would current patterns of acid deposition change 
under new climatic conditions? 
(2) Agricultural soils: Would soil salinization be enhanced by warmer and 
drier summers, and what would be the impact on the leaching of toxic 
materials? 
(3) Wetlands: What would be the environmental impacts of the drying out of 
, wetlands? And if new wetlands were formed due to rising sea level, what 
would be the environmental effects? 
(4) Eutrophication of freshwaters: How would a warmer climate affect rates of 
eu trophication? 
(5) Polluted estuarine sediments: Would the toxic materials in these sediments 
be mobilized as a result of a rise in sea level? 
9.2.2. Environmental discontinuities (break-points) 
Within the last 100 years or so, there have been several major environmental 
discontinuities in Europe. What were the circumstances surrounding these 
events? And what general lessons would help in the management of discontinui-
ties that are bound to occur in the next 50 years? 
Examples of these discontinuities include: 
• The decrease in the pH of Swedish rivers in the 1950s, first publicized by 
Svante Oden in the early 1960s. 
• European forest decline in the 1980s. 
• The great London smog of 1952. 
Associated with this is the question of outer limits or stability limits 
(Gorshkov, 1988) beyond which a system collapses. It may be too optimistic to 
expect to come to grips with the outer-limits problem, but it is worth a try. The 
essence of this study is therefore to prepare a comparative historical review of 
environmental discontinuities in Europe. 
9.3. Tasks Related to Policy Responses 
9.3.1. Resource accounting systems 
Resource accounting (RA) is a term used to denote a data gathering and 
retrieval system for keeping track of stocks and flows of natural resources. There 
is a widespread view that current systems of national economic accounting are 
incomplete and should be broadened to include natural resources. For example, 
a country with a large export-import trade surplus may not be in a healthy posi-
tion if the surplus is at the expense of some non-sustainable uses of its natural 
resources, e.g., mining of the forests. 
It might appear to be easy to establish an RA system. However, there are 








Statistical data are collected by country, province, county or township, 
whose borders rarely correspond with those of ecological systems. 
In the estimation of stocks, accessibility is an important consideration. 
Europe imports wood, for example, partly because of the inaccessibility of 
many forest stands. The quality of stocks is also important although 
difficult to quantify in some cases. 
In order to be useful, an RA must be based on a conceptual model of the 
resource system. The present lack of an agreed upon framework has led to 
fragmentation, inconsistency and gaps in natural resource data bases 
(Friend, 1988). One model is that of mass balance, which permits data to 
be quantified in consistent physical units, permitting estimates to be made 
of material and energy flows and balances. This model is used in Norway 
(Lone, 1987), for example, but other possibilities include the stress-response 
framework developed in Canada (Statistics Canada, 1978) and that of 
supply-demand. 
During the process of converting a stock into a flow, not all of the material 
is useful; some of the residues may go back into the stock or may cause 
harm to the environment. How should these residues be enumerated? 
At what point in the collection and manufacturing chain should the 
resource accounting be done? Should we count trees, logs or boards? 
The design of an RA system depends on the use to which it will be put. In 
the case of water, for example, this depends on whether the water is used 
for drinking, recreation, fishing, industrial coolant, irrigation or hydro-
electric power generation. 
In principle, an RA system would have many practical policy applications 
(IES, 1983): 
• To plan long-term utilization of resources, and the implied environmental 
protection and rehabilitation measures. 
• To support the environmental impact assessment process with respect to 
energy, resource and other development projects. 
• To establish and monitor environmentally motivated regulation of human 
activities. 
• To monitor resource conservation performance. 
• To aid in the preservation of living species and their habitats. 
• To promote education and illuminate public debate. 
In order to provide a rational basis for probing the large-scale policy dilem-
mas facing Europe, an RA system is urgently required. National systems exist 
already in several countries, while components of a European RA have been built 
at IIASA (e.g., a European-wide forest wood-supply data bank) and elsewhere. 
The tasks to be undertaken are as follows: 
(1) Preparation of a state-of-the-art review on the published literature on RA 
systems. 
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(2) Organization of a review Workshop and publication of the results. 
(3) In the context of policy exercises, identification of the specific needs for RA 
systems. 
(4) Development of a framework for an appropriate European-wide system. 
9.3.2. Policy exercises 
(a) Policy exercises should be undertaken at the national level, and also involv-
ing two or three countries that share a geographic feature, e.g., a river 
basin, the Alps, the Adriatic, the Baltic, etc. 
(b) A policy exercise should be undertaken in Eastern Europe, organized along 
the lines described in Section 5, to test the ideas concerning ecological sus-
tainability in an East European context. 
(c) Ultimately, the most important application of policy exercises remains to 
be tested: namely, using them to establish long-term environmental agen-
das for Europe as a whole. Noting that optimal solutions for particular 
geographic areas, sectors or components may in some cases lead to non-
sustainable pathways in other parts of the European "system", it is essen-
tial that policy exercises be used to examine the large-scale environment-
development dilemmas facing Europe in an integrated fashion. Table 7.5 
could provide a framework for such a policy exercise. 
9.3.3. Early warning monitoring systems 
Many of the monitoring systems currently operating in Europe are inadequate as 
early warning indicators of environmental change, however satisfactory they may 
be for other purposes. It is therefore recommended that: 
(1) Current monitoring systems should be expanded to include socioeconomic 
indicators. 
(2) The selection of indicators should be based on some well-formulated models 
of the impacts of socioeconomic stresses on the environment, including its 
valued ecosystem components. 
(3) The system should be harmonized across Europe, providing time and space 
resolutions that meet the needs of the models and of the users of these 
models. 
(4) The data system should be readily accessible and inexpensive to use, 
although the various types of data need not be collected and quality-
controlled by one organization. 
The suggestions made in Section 6 on socioeconomic indicators of environ-
mental change need to be elaborated and tested. At the same time, potential 
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users of such indicators need to be consulted, particularly ECE, EEC, CMEA, 
OECD, WMO and UNEP. 
9.3.4. Tools available to implement public policy 
The objective of public policy is to change society's attitudes and actions, indivi-
dually and collectively. Two of the traditional tools used in this field are regula-
tion and prohibition. However, there are many other possibilities for affecting the 
ways that society thinks and acts over the long term, as pointed out in the 
environmental context by Regier and Grima (1984) and Clark (1987b). For 
example, the construction of a power station, motorway or railway will lead to 
long-term changes in areas influenced by these constructions. Potential changes 
in the environment should be assessed and factored into policy decisions concern-
ing such projects. Two important related considerations are: (1) the lag time 
between adoption of a policy and the achievement of the desired result; and (2) 
the detectability of the change. 
Clark (1987b) has categorized the approaches that could be taken in public 
policy formulation with respect to the availability and use of land and water as 
follows: 
• Modifying the growth/decline and geographic distribution of human popu-
lations. 
• Modifying the preferences and demands of society. 
• Changing the mix of uses of natural resources. 
• Interventions involving market and non-market institutions. 
• Interventions involving international institutions. 
These mechanisms have been used successfully to resolve short-term 
environmental issues. There is need, however, for an examination of their useful-
ness in the case of long-term large-scale problems that are shrouded in uncer-
tainty. As a first step, some background papers on various aspects of this topic 
should be commissioned, followed by a review meeting. The outcome would be a 
series of recommendations, including a research agenda for future work. 
9.3.5. Application to other parts of the world 
The methods developed within the framework of the Study "Future Environ-
ments for Europe" should be applied in other parts of the world. In particular, 
studies should be conducted for less developed regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. In addition, a North American Study should be undertaken, perhaps 
sponsored by the IIASA National Members for the United States and Canada. 
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Some of the Principal Monitoring Systems in Europe 
Introduction 
Many kinds of enviro.nmental monitoring systems are operating in Europe. The major 
objectives, the kind of environmental information collected and the achievements are 
summarized below for the following systems: 
• The CORINE program of the EEC (a co-ordinated information system on the 
state of the environment and natural resources of the European Economic Com-
munity) which was initiated in 1985. The program includes the EEC-12, i.e., Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. 
• The EMEP program (a co-operative program for monitoring and evaluation of 
long range transmission of air pollutants in Europe) of the ECE. 
The CORINE program 
This program was initiated in 1985 with the following objectives: 
(1) To provide information on specific thematic topics (among others, biotopes, 
atmospheric emissions, land use, land quality, and water quality). 
(2) To support the improvement in the organisation of data collected in the European 
Community, its member states or international organizations. 
The CORINE information system has data on the following phenomena (either 













Topography (coastline, water pattern of lakes, canals and reservoirs) . 
Political boundaries (national and regional) . 
Climate (thirty-year monthly and annual averages for factors such as prec1p1ta-
tion, temperature , frost, relative humidity, evapotranspiration , wind speed, cloudi-
ness, solar radiation). 
Soils (the basic soil information originates from the 1: 1 million Soils Map of the 
European Communities including soil type, texture. 
Soil erosion risks and important land resources (areas in the southern part of the 
European Community that are subject to high erosion risks under present land use 
conditions, and erosion hazards along the Community coastline) . 
Biotopes (a registration of sites that are important for nature conservation , 
currently including about 5,000 sites with information on location, area , altitude , 
habitat cover, human activities and species) . 
Water (supply from groundwater and surface water, consumption) . 
Water quality (mean monthly stream discharge for the period 1970 to 1985 includ-
ing factors such as temperature, pH, chlorides, nitrogen , ammonium , dissolved 
oxygen, phosphorus, cadmium, and mercury) . 
Atmospheric emissions (sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic com-
pounds). 
Air quality (sulphur dioxide, smoke/ particulates). 
Less favoured agricultural areas (mountainous or other less favoured areas , which 
require financial and other support to maintain their agriculture) . 
Designated areas (location, region, date of establishment, designation and owner-
ship) . 
In addition to the environmental components included in the CORINE program, 
information is also collected on the following socio-economic and demographic factors : 
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(1) Population (total residents, settlements, and urban / rural distribution}. 
(2) Employment (agriculture, industry, service, manufacturing, transport and com-
munication) . 
(3) Energy (production, consumption, capacity, mining and resources) . 
The EMEP Program 
The objective of the co-operative program for monitoring and evaluation of the long-
range transmission of air pollutants in Europe (EMEP} is to monitor air components 
which can be used for testing models of the long-range transport of air pollutants. The 
sites are located in areas where the influence of local source area is as small as possible, 
and where the measurements can be considered to represent the pollution of a region. 
There are 82 monitoring stations in 23 countries, and most of them belong to 
national networks . The major stations began measurements in January 1978. Informa-
tion is collected on the following components: gases, particles and precipitation: 
Gases include: S02, N02, HN03 , and NH3 . 
Particles include: H+, soi-, N03 and NHt . 
Precipitation includes: soi-, NHt, N03, pH/H+, Mg2+, Na+, and c1- . 
Since EMEP uses information from national networks , different analytical and 






























Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
Oil Companies' European Organization for 
Environmental and Health Protection 
European Economic Community 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe-
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
European Economic Community 
European Free Trade Association 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
Gross National Product 
Gross Regional Product 
Internation Council of Scientific Unions 
Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto , Canada 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Regional Acidification Information and Simulation 
(acid deposition model, IIASA} 
National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection 
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment 
United Nations Environment Program 
World Commission on Environment and Development 
World Health Organization 
World Industry Conference on Environmental Management 
World Meteorological Organization 
Young Scientists' Summer Program (IIASA} 
